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I.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1

Why are the Twin Cities so segregated? The Minneapolis-Saint
Paul metropolitan area is known for its progressive politics and
forward-thinking approach to regional planning, but these features
have not prevented the formation of some of the nation’s widest
racial disparities and the nation’s worst segregation in a
2
predominantly white area. On measures of educational and
residential integration, the Twin Cities region has rapidly diverged
from other regions with similar demographics, such as Portland or

†
Myron Orfield is the Earl R. Larson Professor of Law at the University of
Minnesota Law School and the Director of the Institute on Metropolitan
Opportunity.
†† Will Stancil is a Research Fellow at the Institute on Metropolitan
Opportunity.
1. This article is adapted from a report issued by the Institute on
Metropolitan Opportunity (“IMO”) at the University of Minnesota Law School. See
INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, WHY ARE THE TWIN CITIES SO SEGREGATED? (2015),
https://www1.law.umn.edu/uploads/ed/00/ed00c05a000fffeb881655f2e02e9f29
/Why-Are-the-Twin-Cities-So-Segregated-2-26-15.pdf.
2. See infra Part II.
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Seattle. Since the start of the twenty-first century, the number of
severely segregated schools in the Twin Cities area has increased
more than seven-fold; the population of segregated, high-poverty
4
neighborhoods has tripled. The concentration of black families in
low-income areas has grown for over a decade; in Portland and
5
Seattle, it has declined. In 2010, the Minneapolis-Saint Paul region
had eighty-three schools made up of ninety percent nonwhite
6
students; Portland had two.
The following article explains this paradox. In doing so, it
broadly describes the history and structure of two growing industry
pressure groups within the Twin Cities political scene: the poverty
7
housing industry (PHI) and the poverty education complex
8
(PEC). It shows how these powerful special interests have worked
with local, regional, and state government to preserve the
segregated status quo and in the process have undermined school
integration and sabotaged the nation’s most effective regional
9
housing integration program. Finally, in what should serve as a call
to action on civil rights, this article demonstrates how even
moderate efforts to achieve racial integration could dramatically
10
reduce regional segregation and the associated racial disparities.
Although the Twin Cities were committed to civil rights and
racial integration through much of the 1970s, this commitment
began to collapse in the mid-1980s. Political apathy about racial
equality was accompanied by exclusionary housing practices in the
3.
4.

See infra Part II.
METRO. COUNCIL, CHOICE, PLACE AND OPPORTUNITY: AN EQUITY
ASSESSMENT OF THE TWIN CITIES REGION, SECTION FIVE: RACIALLY CONCENTRATED
AREAS OF POVERTY IN THE REGION 5 (2014), http://www.metrocouncil.org
/METC/files/35/35358ee4-7976-42e6-999d-9e54790d45fe.pdf
[hereinafter
CHOICE, PLACE AND OPPORTUNITY] (“The most recent data show that 9% of
[Minneapolis/Saint Paul’s] total population currently lives in a [RaciallyConcentrated Area of Poverty] tract—up from 3% in 1990.”); see also Alana
Semuels, Segregation in Paradise?, THE ATLANTIC (July 12, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/07/twin-cities-segregation
/490970/ (discussing school and community segregation in the Twin Cities).
5. See infra Figure 4 (“Chart 3”) in Part II.
6. Statistics are from data compiled by the Institute of Metropolitan
Opportunity, University of Minnesota Law School. Data is on file with author and
is available upon request.
7. See infra Section III.A.
8. See infra Section III.B.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part VI.
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11

suburbs. Increasing concern over the availability of affordable
housing accelerated the growth of the subsidized housing industry
12
within the central cities—the PHI. The cities themselves
participated in this process, creating the Family Housing Fund, a
“quasipublic” intermediary, which produced thousands of housing
13
units in Minneapolis and Saint Paul. As a result of segregation,
city schools declined, which gave momentum to a “school choice”
movement that sought to implement free-market ideas in the
14
education system. These so-called “education reformers” would
15
become the PEC. Its policies have increased and preserved the
16
growth of educational segregation.
The PHI and PEC are both complex networks of affiliated
organizations and professionals, stretching through the public,
17
private, and nonprofit worlds. The PHI centers around nonprofit
housing developers but also includes funding intermediaries, for18
profit tax credit “syndicators,” attorneys, and lobbyists. The PEC
includes well-funded political advocacy groups, consultants, and, of
19
course, many charter schools and charter school networks. Both
the PHI and PEC are industries in their own right, employing
thousands and receiving hundreds of millions of dollars from the
20
government and charitable foundations.
Unfortunately, the PHI and PEC depend heavily on the
segregated status quo. The PHI’s network of professional
connections is densest in the low-income central-city
neighborhoods where segregation is greatest, and the majority of
affordable housing is consequently sited in these areas, which offer
21
The PHI
minimal resistance to affordable development.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, THE RISE OF WHITE-SEGREGATED SUBSIDIZED
HOUSING
1
(2016),
https://www1.law.umn.edu/uploads/15/8a
/158a9849bb744b4573b59f51e4f0ab54/IMO-White-Segregated-Subsidized
-Housing-5-18-2016.pdf [hereinafter THE RISE OF WHITE-SEGREGATED SUBSIDIZED
HOUSING].
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frequently dominates both politics and the local economy in these
neighborhoods. The raison d’être of education reform is correcting
the perceived failings of central-city schools—failures that arise
from the massive concentration of low-income, nonwhite students
22
in these schools. Regional school integration is not on the agenda
of the PEC, and thus such policy initiatives would threaten the
influx of charitable funding into PEC organizations.
Pressure from these two political constituencies have led to a
series of governmental actions and policies that have had the effect
of creating and perpetuating regional segregation:
 The abandonment of a Metropolitan Council Housing
Plan, which enforced the legal requirement that all cities
23
build a “fair share” of moderate- and low-income housing.
 A revision of the state’s school desegregation rule to allow
intentionally racially segregated schools to persist
24
indefinitely without penalty.
 The exemption of charter schools and the open
enrollment system from the school desegregation rule,
undermining local districts’ ability to pursue integrated
25
education.
 Consistently increasing affordable housing goals for the
diverse central cities, and the concomitant decrease of the
26
same goals for affluent, majority-white suburbs.
 The rise of massive public-private interaction in the
affordable housing industry, such as the Corridors of
Opportunity group, which sought to place nearly half the
region’s new subsidized housing—4500 units—in
27
segregated areas along the Cities’ newest light rail line.
 The failure to consider the impact of affordable housing
and education policies on older, first-ring suburbs, where
segregation and concentrated poverty are growing

22. See INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, THE MINNESOTA SCHOOL CHOICE
PROJECT PART I: SEGREGATION AND PERFORMANCE 17 (2017), https://www.law.umn
.edu/sites/law.umn.edu/files/imo-mscp-report-part-one-segregation-and
-performance.pdf [hereinafter MINNESOTA SCHOOL CHOICE PROJECT PART I].
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Part III.
27. See infra Part III.
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28

rapidly, endangering municipalities’ financial stability
and, consequently, their ability to provide basic services to
29
residents.
The combined effect of these policies, and similar actions at
the local and state level, has been to reverse progress towards
integration. Severe segregation—where less than one student in ten
is white—has grown explosively in the region’s school districts,
afflicting approximately 1% of all area schools in 1995 but more
30
than 11% today. The concerted effort to achieve integration by
locating subsidized housing to the suburbs, which started in the
31
early 1970s and made substantial gains for the first fifteen years,
has stalled completely; as shown in Figure 1, the central cities’
relative share of subsidized housing has been increasing for
32
decades and is now higher than at any point since the 1960s.

28. See infra Part III.
29. See infra Part III.
30. Statistics are from data compiled by the Institute of Metropolitan
Opportunity, University of Minnesota Law School. Data is on file with author and
is available upon request.
31. Derek Thompson, The Miracle of Minneapolis, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/the-miracle-of
-minneapolis/384975/ (“Minnesota passed a law in 1976 requiring all local
governments to plan for their fair share of affordable housing. The Twin Cities
enforced this rule vigorously . . . .”); see also INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY,
REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN THE TWIN CITIES TO CUT COSTS AND REDUCE
SEGREGATION
1
(2014),
https://www1.law.umn.edu/uploads/ee/52
/ee52be92915228d3a453e5428ea40c07/Subsidized-Housing-in-the-Twin-Cities-1-7
-14.pdf [hereinafter REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN THE TWIN CITIES] (“At one
time, the Twin Cities implemented one of the most integrative affordable housing
programs in the nation, but its housing integration program was abandoned in
1986.”).
32. See REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note 31, at 1
(“In recent decades, the central cities have captured a disproportionate share of
subsidized housing funding.”); see also infra Figure 1 (indicating the increase in
central cities’ share of subsidized housing since 1980); Section III.A. (discussing
disproportionate concentration of subsidized housing in central cities).
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Figure 1.
Making matters worse, some older suburbs have themselves
become segregated. Today, only 15% of subsidized housing units
are in areas where schools are less than 30% nonwhite, the lowest
33
figure since the beginning of the regional housing program. Lack
of regional support for desegregation has handicapped prointegrative organizations such as the Dakota County Community
Development Agency. In the words of its director, “The policies are
what drive the funding, and the policies come from the
Met[ropolitan]
Council
board . . .
and
the
Minnesota
Legislature . . . . [T]hey favor funding priorities that are not as
34
prevalent in the suburban area.”
In the absence of countervailing pressures in the public and
private sector, real progress on regional, residential, and

33. REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note 31, at 7
(“[N]early 60 percent of subsidized units are in attendance boundaries for
majority nonwhite schools, even though those areas have less than a fourth of all
students in the region.”).
34. Jessie Van Berkel, Suburbs Feel Shorted on Funds for Affordable Housing, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis-Saint Paul) (Oct. 31, 2014, 11:36 PM) (quoting Mark Ulfers,
director
of
Dakota
County’s
Community
Development
Agency),
http://www.startribune.com/suburbs-feel-shorted-on-funds-for-affordable-housing
/281132522/.
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educational integration would be possible. A proactive approach to
housing integration, in which subsidized housing units are
distributed evenly across the region and Section 8 rental vouchers
beneficiaries are distributed in proportion to regional population,
would shift 9700 additional nonwhite students to schools that are
35
currently white or integrated. This would account for 80% of the
student moves necessary to create a fully integrated regional school
system, obviating the need for busing or other aggressive
36
remedies.
In order to reduce regional inequality, create a more
competitive region, and build a better-functioning society, it is
imperative that the Twin Cities reconsider their approach to
subsidized housing and education.
II. WHY ARE THE TWIN CITIES SO SEGREGATED?
37

The Twin Cities are affluent, generous, and progressive.
38
There are dozens of organizations dedicated to serving the poor.
Why are racial disparities in the Cities as great as or greater than
39
racial disparities in any part of the nation? Why are our schools
and neighborhoods much more segregated than regions with
similar racial and economic characteristics like Seattle and
Portland? It is becoming clear that many of the efforts originally
intended to address poverty today actually contribute to severe and
growing racial and social isolation in schools and neighborhoods,

35.
36.
37.

See infra Figure 6 (“Table 2”) in Part VI.
See infra Figure 6 (“Table 2”) in Part VI.
See generally What the Twin Cities Can Teach Us About Living Well,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 18, 2013, 8:31 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2013/11/18/minneapolis-health-happin_n_4213678.html.
38. See Our Members, METROPOLITAN CONSORTIUM OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPERS,
http://www.mccdmn.org/membership/our-members/ (last visited Mar. 10,
2017). See generally Cynthia Boyd, Poverty Surging in Twin Cities’ Suburbs, MINNPOST
(Oct. 27, 2011), https://www.minnpost.com/community-sketchbook/2011/10
/poverty-surging-twin-cities-suburbs (discussing multiple organizations and
nonprofits that are committed to bettering the circumstances of individuals in
poverty).
39. See Christopher Magan, Minnesota’s Worsening Racial Disparity: Why it
Matters to Everyone, PIONEER PRESS (Minneapolis-Saint Paul) (Apr. 29, 2016, 1:00
PM),
http://www.twincities.com/2016/04/29/minnesotas-racial-disparities
-worsening -why-and-why-it-matters/ (“Minnesota has some of the worst racial
disparities in the nation . . . .”).
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preserving the segregation that is at the root of racial inequality in
40
the United States.
Ironically, as affluent suburbs become gradually more willing
to allow economic and racial integration, a growing privatized
poverty “industry” has itself become a new bulwark of segregation
41
in housing and schools. Nonprofit organizations fight for funding
to spend on low-income housing concentrated in the region’s
poorest neighborhoods, where there are no jobs and where the
schools—from which most children fail to even graduate—function
42
as pathways to prison. Little funding is left for affluent suburbs
that boast strong schools and job opportunities, and in recent years
their applications for affordable housing have been turned down
43
with surprising frequency.
Within the region’s education system, many policies persist
that encourage or accelerate segregation. Self-styled education
“reformers” advocate for single-race charter schools, some quite
44
brazenly. The charter system is dominated by segregated, lowperforming institutions that only offer dead ends for many
45
students. By serving specific racial groups, charters deepen
segregation and undermine the efforts of public schools, which
have been financially weakened and are becoming more
46
47
segregated. Other policies—like the placement of schools —

40. See Myron Orfield et al., Taking a Holistic View of Housing Policy, 26 HOUS.
POL’Y DEBATE 284, 286 (2016) (stating that housing vouchers have historically
been used in extremely concentrated areas, leading to the segregation of nearby
schools).
41. See REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING POLICY IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note
31, at 13–15.
42. See id. at 1–3 (showing that a school’s rate of poverty shares a positive
correlation to low student success rates). See generally Raj Chetty & Nathaniel
Hendren, The Impacts of Neighborhoods on Intergenerational Mobility I: Childhood
Exposure Effects (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23001, 2016),
http://www.equality-of-opportunity.org/assets/documents/movers_paper1.pdf.
43. See REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING POLICY IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note
31, at 1, 5.
44. See INST. ON RACE & POVERTY, FAILED PROMISES: ASSESSING CHARTER
SCHOOLS IN THE TWIN CITIES 1, 38–39 (2008), http://www1.law.umn.edu/uploads
/5f/ca/5fcac972c2598a7a50423850eed0f6b4/8-Failed-Promises-Assessing-Charter
-Schools-in-the-Twin-Cities.pdf [hereinafter FAILED PROMISES]; see also MINNESOTA
SCHOOL CHOICE PROJECT PART I, supra note 22, at 17.
45. See FAILED PROMISES, supra note 44, at 40; see also MINNESOTA SCHOOL
CHOICE PROJECT PART I, supra note 22, at 17.
46. See FAILED PROMISES, supra note 44, at 40–43.
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create durable avenues for white flight and facilitate the divestment
48
of resources from the region’s neediest school districts. Despite
evidence to the contrary, local education policymakers, charter
boosters, and reformers continue to argue that gaps can be closed
without addressing segregation and even assert that segregated
49
schools are more effective than integrated ones.
It is clear that this generous, progressive region must again
work to become less segregated. Minnesota was once a national
leader on civil rights, and the state has many laws and policies that
50
could, if used, create more integration and less racial disparity.
While resistance to integration in affluent communities remains
51
strong, it is declining. When affluent communities and schools
attempt greater integration, poverty advocates should help them,
not undermine their efforts.
In the past, the Twin Cities’ reputation for progressive civil
rights activism was well deserved. Minneapolis was the first large
city in the country to enact a fair housing ordinance, and
Minnesota was one of the first states to pass a civil rights law
outlawing housing discrimination. Support for civil rights from
prominent politicians and governmental bodies was strong:

47. See id. at 37 (arguing that highly integrated public schools spur white
enrollment to charter schools in close proximity).
48. See id. at 43 (discussing how poor urban school districts divert alreadyscarce funding toward marketing budgets to compete for enrollment with nearby
charter schools).
49. See id. at 49 (noting that, instead of actually integrating the schools,
school districts have “racial contact” programs, i.e., multicultural day, but that
these measures have had little to no effect on integration); see also Beena
Raghavendran & MaryJo Webster, Desegregation Lawsuit Pulls in State’s Charter
Schools, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-Saint Paul) (Nov. 30, 2015, 11:59 AM),
http://www.startribune.com/desegregation-lawsuit-pulls-in-state-s-charter-schools
/358457791/.
50. See, e.g., Christopher Magan, Judge Rejects Minnesota’s School Integration
Plans, PIONEER PRESS (Minneapolis-Saint Paul) (Mar. 22, 2016, 2:24 PM),
http://www.twincities.com/2016/03/22/judge-rejects-minnesotas-school
-integration-plans/ (describing a now defunct integration scheme enacted in
Minnesota in the 1990s).
51. See, e.g., KIM BRIDGES, THE CENTURY FOUND., EDEN PRAIRIE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS: ADAPTING TO DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN THE SUBURBS (Oct. 14, 2016),
https://tcf.org/content/report/eden-prairie-public-schools/ (describing the
history of resistance to integration in the suburb of Eden Prairie, as well as its
recent decline).
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Not only did Hubert Humphrey and Walter Mondale hail
from the Twin Cities, but so did Roy Wilkins, Clarence
Mitchell, and Whitney Young. Republican governor Elmer
Anderson pushed the Human Rights Act through the
legislature and Congressman Al Quie helped build a
Republican consensus to support the major civil rights
acts of the 1960s. In the 1960s and 1970s, the state created
a regional government, the Metropolitan Council [“Met
Council”], and enacted a fair-share requirement in the
Metropolitan Land Use Planning Act that required that
all suburban communities provide their fair share of
affordable housing. The Met Council worked with the
Minnesota Housing Finance Agency to adopt the nation’s
52
best regional fair housing program.
The Met Council explicitly sought to improve housing choice by
opening up all of the region’s communities to low-income
53
residents, and in the ten years prior to 1980, the percentage of
regional cities offering subsidized housing increased from 8% to
54
51%.
Also in the early 1970s, Minneapolis integrated its public
schools pursuant to court order, and the state government used the
momentum created by this lawsuit to adopt a desegregation rule
55
that required racially integrated schools throughout Minnesota.
This rule aggressively reduced existing segregation and contained
mechanisms to prevent integrated schools from slowly transitioning
back into racial isolation.
As a result of all of these efforts in the 1970s and early 1980s,
the Twin Cities was on a path to become one of the most integrated
56
metropolitan areas in the United States. It had all the tools in
57
place to do so, and they were working as planned. As shown in

52. INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, APPENDIX I: IMO MEMORANDUM PROVIDED
HOUSINGLINK REGARDING AI REQUIREMENTS 3 (Oct. 10 2014),
https://www1.law.umn.edu/uploads/87/2b/872b706a4820ba6fe45aa279a8a1eaab
/IMO-Comments-on-FHIC-AI-Appendices.pdf [hereinafter IMO MEMORANDUM].
53. See id.
54. Alana Semuels, Segregation Holds On in the Twin Cities, CITYLAB (Jul. 13,
2016),
http://www.citylab.com/politics/2016/07/segregation-in-the-twin-cities
/491162/; see also CHOICE, PLACE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 4, at 5.
55. IMO MEMORANDUM, supra note 52, at 3.
56. Id.
57. Id.
TO

2017]

WHY ARE THE TWIN CITIES SO SEGREGATED?

11

Figure 2 (“Chart 1”), in the early 1990s, only about 2000 (or 2.5%)
of the region’s nonwhite students were in schools that were more
58
than 90% nonwhite, and only 3% of the region’s population lived
59
in majority nonwhite, high-poverty areas.

Figure 2.
Likewise, black residents living in census tracts that were more than
60
50% minority decreased from 45% in 1970 to 38% in 1980. On
the other hand, by the 1980s and 1990s, the region saw increasing
shares of American Indians, Asians, and Hispanics in majority
minority tracts, and by the 1990s, there was a reversal of the long61
term decrease in black shares in those tracts.
58. School data is for the eleven Minnesota counties in the Twin Cities metro
area in 1995 and is from the Minnesota Department of Education. See Data Reports
and Analytics, MINN. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://w20.education.state.mn.us
/MDEAnalytics/Data.jsp (last visited Dec. 13, 2016).
59. CHOICE, PLACE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 4, at 5 (1990 data).
60. See Figure 2 (“Chart 1”). A color version of this graph is available on the
Mitchell
Hamline
Law
Review
issue
archive
at
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol43/iss1/.
61. Black shares in majority minority census tracts were calculated from IMO
data provided by the Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota,
which manages the National Historical Geographic Information System. See
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By 2010, the number of schools made up of more than 90%
nonwhite students had increased more than sevenfold (from eleven
to eighty-three); the number of nonwhite students in those highly
segregated environments had risen by more than ten times (from
2000 to 25,400)—a percentage increase from 2.5% to 16%; and the
share of the regional population in majority nonwhite, high-poverty
62
areas rose by three times to 9%.
Some of these changes simply reflect the fact that the region
became more racially diverse during the period. However, other
metro areas of roughly the same size and with similar demographic
histories have not shown the same pattern of deterioration in racial
segregation. For instance, as shown in Figure 3 (“Chart 2”), the
number of schools in the Portland metro made up of more than
90% nonwhite students was just two in 2009 (up from zero in 2000)
63
and in Seattle it was only twenty-five (up from fourteen). The
neighborhood comparisons are no better, as shown in Figure 4
(“Chart 3”). In 2012, 19% of low-income black residents of the
Twin Cities lived in high-poverty census tracts (up from 13% in
2000) compared to just 3.4% of low-income black residents in
Seattle (down from 3.5% in 2000) and 1.6% in Portland (down
64
from 1.9% in 2000).

National
Historical
Geographic
Information
System,
UNIV. OF MINN.,
https://data2.nhgis.org/main (last visited Dec. 13, 2016).
62. CHOICE, PLACE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 4, at 5.
CENTER
FOR
EDUC.
STAT.,
63. Surveys
&
Programs,
NAT’L
http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2016). The equivalent numbers
for the Twin Cities from this source were 112 schools with more than 90%
nonwhite students in 2009 compared to 37 such schools in 2000. Id. See also infra
Figure 3 (“Chart 2”) in this Part.
64. See infra Figure 4 (“Chart 3”) in this Part. PAUL JARGOWSKY, CTR. FOR
URBAN RESEARCH & EDUC., RUTGERS UNIV., COMPILATION OF BUREAU OF THE CENSUS
DATA (on file with author). Similar differences for Hispanic residents exist across
the metros. Id.
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Figure 4.
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In the Twin Cities, as elsewhere in the nation, racial isolation
and economic decline are intertwined. As the following maps
demonstrate, the growth of poverty since 1980 has mirrored
65
patterns of segregation.

65. Maps 1 and 2 were created by IMO using data from the Minnesota
Population Center. See National Historical Geographic Information System: Version 2.0.,
UNIV. OF MINN. (2011), http://www.nhgis.org. Maps 3 and 4 were created by IMO
using data from the United States Census Bureau. Larger versions of these maps
are available in color at the Mitchell Hamline Law Review website:
http://mitchellhamline.edu/law-review/wp-content/uploads/sites
/37/2017/05/Orfield_Why-Are-the-Twin-Cities-So-Segregated_Maps.pdf.
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While affluent, white enclaves in the south and southwest of the
central cities have remained stable, poverty has dramatically
worsened in much of Minneapolis and Saint Paul, as well as many
66
of the older, first-ring suburbs. In this way, segregation has helped

66. See Steve Berg, Policies that Built First-Ring Suburbs in 1950s Now Foster Their
Decline, MINNPOST (Apr. 1, 2011), https://www.minnpost.com/cityscape/2011/04
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wrench apart the economic fabric of the region, as neighborhoods
or even entire cities have found themselves crippled by the rapid,
67
destabilizing increase in poverty.
In this environment, even programs designed to increase
housing choice can backfire and accelerate segregation. For
instance, the Section 8 Housing Voucher program is intended to
provide families with flexibility in the private housing market and,
in doing so, help prevent the concentration of poverty that is
68
associated with public housing. Instead, in the Twin Cities,
Section 8 has replicated the ill effects of public housing. The Twin
Cities contain a number of dense “clusters” of Section 8 voucher
69
holders, concentrating poverty to a remarkable degree. A small
census tract in Minneapolis’s Phillips community concentrates
voucher holders at the rate of 802 per square mile. In another tract
in the Aurora-Saint Anthony neighborhood in Saint Paul, with 583
voucher holders per square mile, 19% of households are using a
70
voucher. Of the 705 census tracts in the Twin Cities metropolitan
area, only twenty-one have household voucher use rates above
71
10%—eight in Saint Paul, and twelve in Minneapolis. By
comparison, a vast number of census tracts—even densely
populated census tracts—contain virtually no Section 8 voucher
beneficiaries. Within the metropolitan area, 37.4% of households
live in census tracts where five or fewer Section 8 vouchers have
been put to use; 11.3% live in tracts without a single voucher
72
whatsoever.
Segregation and the concentration of poverty are no longer
confined to the central cities. These problems have spilled over

/policies-built-first-ring-suburbs-1950s-now-foster-their-decline.
67. See, e.g., MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR
COMMUNITY AND STABILITY 3 (1997) (citing 1990 Summary Tape File 3A, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (1992), http://www2.census.gov/census_1990/1990STF3.html#3A) (“In
the 1980s, the Twin Cities became the nation’s fourth fastest ghettoizing region.”).
68. Christopher Swope, Section 8 is Broken, NAT’L HOUSING INST.:
SHELTERFORCE ONLINE, Jan.–Feb. 2003, www.nhi.org/online/issues/sf127.html. See
generally Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV.,
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/housing_choice_voucher
_program_section_8 (last visited Dec. 13, 2016).
69. Voucher concentration figures were generated using 2010 U.S. Census
data.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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into the region’s older suburbs, particularly the first-ring suburbs in
73
close proximity to segregated central-city neighborhoods. Many of
these cities are in the process of rapid, destabilizing racial and
economic transition, as flight from growing segregation pushes
74
middle-class residents into the urban fringe. These changes
frequently start in a city’s schools, where open enrollment,
alternative schooling options, and other instruments of white flight
can help “flip” an integrated district into severe segregation in a
matter of years. For instance, in the fifteen years following 1997,
the Brooklyn Center school district transitioned from 41%
nonwhite to 84% nonwhite, and 38% low-income to 82% low75
School transition often precipitates residential
income.
76
segregation. In the decade following the 2000 United States
Census, Brooklyn Center has become rapidly more segregated, with
the number of white residents declining dramatically, from over
77
two-thirds of the population to less than one-half.
Not surprisingly, the region now shows some of the widest
racial disparities in the country. Recent data show alarming gaps
between whites and nonwhites in income, unemployment, health,
and education. Poverty rates for black Minnesotans are more than
78
four times those for whites; household incomes for blacks are less

73. See, e.g., CHOICE, PLACE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 4, at 23 (contrasting
the sharp decrease in white residents with the drastic increase in the percentage of
rental properties in Brooklyn Center and Brooklyn Park between 1990 and 2010).
74. See Daniel T. Lichter, et al., Toward a New Macro-Segregation? Decomposing
Segregation Within and Between Metropolitan Cities and Suburbs, 80(4) AM. SOC. REV.
843, 846 (2015) (describing an increase in macro-segregation as whites leave
increasingly integrated cities and suburbs within large metro areas).
75. Percentages were calculated by IMO from data provided by the
Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota, which manages the
National Historical Geographic Information System. See National Historical
Geographic Information System: Version 2.0., UNIV. OF MINN. (2011),
http://www.nhgis.org.
76. See generally Richard Rothstein, The Racial Achievement Gap, Segregated
Schools, and Segregated Neighborhoods—A Constitutional Insult, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Nov.
12, 2014), http://www.epi.org/publication/the-racial-achievement-gap-segregated
-schools-and-segregated-neighborhoods-a-constitutional-insult/.
77. Races in Brooklyn Center, Minnesota (MN) Detailed Stats, CITY-DATA.COM,
http://www.city-data.com/races/races-Brooklyn-Center-Minnesota.html
(last
visited Dec. 13, 2016).
78. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE S1701, POVERTY STATUS IN THE LAST 12
MONTHS: AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 5-YEAR ESTIMATES, 2010–2014,
http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/14_1YR/S1701
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79

than half of those for whites; reading proficiency rates for black
students are less than half those for whites in most school grades
80
and years; incarceration rates for blacks are twenty to twenty-five
81
times greater than for whites; and black unemployment rates are
82
two to three times those for whites. All of these disparities put the
83
region and state near the bottom of national rankings.
What has brought us to this pass? How did a state and a region
once at the forefront of civil rights and integration efforts fall so
far? The answers lie in a complex web of actions by public,

/0400000US27 (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (showing a 36.5% poverty rate for black
Minnesotans versus 8.9% poverty rate for white Minnesotans).
79. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SELECTED ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS,
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml
?src=bkmk (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (showing that the median annual income
for black Minnesotans was $29,873 versus $63,127 for white Minnesotans).
80. See Third Grade Reading Proficiency, MINNESOTA: WORLD’S BEST WORKFORCE,
https://mn.gov/mmb/worlds-best-workforce/key-goals/third-grade-reading.jsp
(last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (illustrating third grade reading proficiency rates);
Third Grade Students Achieving Reading Standards by Race: Minnesota, 2006–2016,
MINNESOTA COMPASS, http://www.mncompass.org/disparities/race#1-9515-d.
81. Jeff Severns Guntzel, Aging Inmates, Racial Disproportionality, and Other
Facts About Minnesota Prisons, MINNPOST (Dec. 2, 2010), https://www.minnpost
.com/intelligencer/2010/12/aging-inmates-racial-disproportionality-and-other
-facts-about-minnesota-prison (“Studies of state prison populations in the 1980s
and early 1990s found that Minnesota’s black per capita incarceration rates were
about 20 times higher than white rates—the highest ratio reported for any state.
Minnesota has done better in more recent studies, but its ratio of black to white
incarceration rates is still in the top quartile.”). See generally Andy Mannix,
Minnesota Sends Minorities to Prison at Far Higher Rates than Whites, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis-Saint Paul) (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.startribune.com/minnesota
-sends-minorities-to-prison-at-far-higher-rates-than-whites/374543811/ (discussing
racial incarceration disparities in Minnesota).
82. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE S2301, EMPLOYMENT STATUS: AMERICAN
COMMUNITY SURVEY 5-YEAR ESTIMATES, 2010–2014, http://factfinder.census.gov
/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk (last visited Dec. 13,
2016) (showing that the unemployment rate for black Minnesotans was 16.4%
versus 5.6% for white Minnesotans); see also Ben Johnson, Blacks Nearly Four Times
More Likely Than Whites to Be Unemployed in Minnesota, CITYPAGES.COM (MinneapolisSaint Paul) (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.citypages.com/news/blacks-nearly-four
-times-more-likely-than-whites-to-be-unemployed-in-minnesota-6539946.
83. See, e.g., JONATHAN M. ROSE, DISPARITY ANALYSIS: A REVIEW OF DISPARITIES
BETWEEN WHITE MINNESOTANS AND OTHER RACIAL GROUPS 3 (2013),
https://mn.gov/cmah/assets/COBM%20-%202013%20Research%20Report
%20on%20Disparities_tcm32-33686.pdf. Various reports are also available at
http://minnesotabudgetbites.org.
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nonprofit, and private actors during the last thirty years in a
number of policy areas, including housing, finance, education, and
transportation. Due to political and governmental apathy, the wellmeaning, but misdirected, efforts of housing developers and school
reformers, as well as the proliferation of organizations and groups
with a firm financial interest in maintaining segregated living
patterns, our state has slowly reversed its civil rights heritage.
III. THE ORIGINS OF RESEGREGATION
A.

Housing Policy and the Rise of the Poverty Housing Industry (PHI)

Resegregation began in the early 1980s. Rudy Perpich
returned to the governor’s office in 1983, alongside a solidly
84
Democratic and liberal legislature. Largely uninterested in
metropolitan affairs, Perpich’s initial appointee to chair the Met
Council was Gerald Isaacs, a banker soon accused of having a
85
conflict of interest and forced to resign. During Isaacs’s and his
successor’s troubled tenures, the nation’s most effective fair
86
housing program, Policy 13, was gradually dismantled.
Policy 13 was reaffirmed in the Met Council’s 1985 Housing
87
Policy Plan, which was renamed “Policy 39” in 1977. Under this
policy, the Met Council required communities to end exclusionary
88
89
zoning and assigned each community a “fair share” goal. The
84. Perpich, Sr., Rudolph George “Rudy, R.G.,” MINN. LEGIS. REFERENCE LIBR.,
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/legdb/fulldetail?ID=10522 (last visited Dec. 13,
2016).
85. See WILLIAM C. JOHNSON, GROWTH MANAGEMENT IN THE TWIN CITIES
REGION: THE POLITICS AND PERFORMANCE OF THE METROPOLITAN COUNCIL 42, 50
(Thomas P. Zeit ed., 1998), http://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle
/11299/2055/1/Johnson_Growth_Management.pdf
(discussing
Perpich’s
disinterest relative to his predecessor).
86. See METRO. COUNCIL, HOUSING POLICY PLAN 81 (2014), https://
metrocouncil.org/METC/files/e3/e3202e04-5ed7-48a3-81b9-e0e5a9c83b2b.pdf.
87. See METRO. COUNCIL, OVERVIEW OF THE COUNCIL’S RESPONSE TO THE FAIR
HOUSING COMPLAINT FILED WITH HUD 10 (2015), http://www.metrocouncil.org
/getdoc/43691b3d-ffd3-42d5-a57d-d0667660571e/BusinessItem.aspx [hereinafter
OVERVIEW OF THE COUNCIL’S RESPONSE].
88. See generally John Charles Boger, Toward Ending Residential Segregation: A
Fair Share Proposal for the Next Reconstruction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1573 (1993).
89. See All. for Metro. Stability v. Metro. Council, 671 N.W.2d 905, 911
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (“Beginning in the late 1970s, based on that formula, the
Council calculated affordable housing needs for each community and issued
guidelines for local governments to follow to create affordable housing
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state housing-finance agency allocated the state’s housing resources
90
so that these communities could actually achieve their goals. If the
suburbs wanted access to state funds for roads, sewers, and parks,
91
they had to allow affordable housing to be built. The Council at
the time described the suburban reaction as “one of anger, hostility
92
and frustration.” Nonetheless, the Met Council’s staff maintained
that “the review role [was] an invaluable tool for implementing
policy,” and the body continued to leverage its funding powers to
93
encourage integration. In their words, “the available evidence
strongly suggests that minority populations would like a far broader
opportunity for suburban and rural living than they presently
94
have.” And for a time, the Council largely succeeded in providing
those opportunities.
From 1971 to 1979, the Twin Cities built as much as 73% of all
95
new subsidized housing in suburbs, the best record in the nation.
At the beginning of this period, 90% of the Twin Cities’ subsidized
units were located in the two central cities, and only sixteen of the
96
region’s 189 municipalities had any subsidized housing at all. By
1979, almost 40% of the total subsidized units were located in the
opportunities. By the early 1980s, cities began producing housing elements as part
of their comprehensive plans with designations to meet the targets provided by the
Council.”).
90. See CHOICE, PLACE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 4, at 10.
91. See id.
92. METRO. COUNCIL, HOUSING OPPORTUNITY IN THE TWIN CITIES AREA: A STAFF
BACKGROUND REPORT ON THE LOCAL AND REGIONAL RESPONSE 1967–1978, at 3
(1978) (on file with author).
93. Id. at 9.
94. Id.
95. METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING ACTIVITY IN THE TWIN CITIES
METROPOLITAN AREA 6 (1980) [hereinafter 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING ACTIVITY] (on
file with author); see also IMO MEMORANDUM, supra note 52, at 18–19 (citing Robert
H. Freilich & John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Timing and Sequential Controls—The Essential
Basis for Effective Regional Planning: An Analysis of the New Directions for Land Use
Control in the Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Region, 58 MINN. L. REV. 1009 (1974))
(“In direct response to the passage of the Federal Fair Housing Act and the
promulgation of its siting rules, the first school desegregation lawsuit against the
state of Minnesota, and the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Mount
Laurel, the Met Council (pursuant to its statutory and constitutional duty to
achieve a fair share distribution of affordable housing) and the Minnesota
Housing Finance Agency (now Minnesota Housing) created and operated the
most effective suburban affordable housing plan with the greatest pro-integrative
civil rights effect in the nation’s history.” (internal citations omitted)).
96. See 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING ACTIVITY, supra note 95, at 6.
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suburbs, and low-income families had subsidized options in ninety97
seven different communities. Slowly but surely, central-city
98
housing segregation was being erased.
But this would ultimately prove the high-water mark for
regional integration. The suburban share of affordable housing,
which increased from 10% to 40% in just a decade, has remained
almost unchanged to the present day, even as the regional
99
population shifted more and more into the suburbs. In more than
thirty years, the central cities’ share of regional subsidized housing
100
has never dipped below 57%. In other words, by the 1980s, the
forces that would block further progress had begun to coalesce in
earnest.
During the 1970s, the Met Council chair, Al Hofstede—at the
time, a former Minneapolis Alderman and the city’s future
mayor—had been forced to fight a constant rearguard action to
101
keep affordable housing subsidies in the suburbs. He pushed
state and local governments to avoid concentrating housing
subsidies in the two central cities and to deploy these resources in
the suburbs to create a more racially integrated metropolitan
102
But directing affordable housing towards the suburbs
area.
103
inevitably kept these resources out of the central cities. This

97.
98.
99.

Id.
See id.
EDWARD G. GOETZ, KAREN CHAPPLE & BARBARA LUKERMANN, THE
AFFORDABLE HOUSING LEGACY OF THE 1976 LAND USE PLANNING ACT (Jan. 2002),
https://conservancy.umn.edu/handle/11299/1960.
100. Statistics are from data compiled by the Institute of Metropolitan
Opportunity, University of Minnesota Law School. Data is on file with author and
is available upon request. See also REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING POLICY IN THE
TWIN CITIES, supra note 31, at 3; see also Will Stancil, Affordable Housing Is an
STREETS.MN
(Oct.
8,
2015),
Industry,
Too,
http://streets.mn/2015/10/08/affordable-housing-is-an-industry-too/.
101. See IMO MEMORANDUM, supra note 52, at 18–19.
102. Id. at 20 (citing METRO. COUNCIL, DISCUSSION STATEMENT ON
METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT POLICY 39 (Oct. 1973)).
103. Id. at 29 (citing BERKELEY PLANNING ASSOCS., ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF
THE HOUSING OPPORTUNITY PLAN (AHOP) FINAL REPORT: VOLUME II, CASE STUDY
NARRATIVES (1979) (prepared for the Office of Community Planning and Housing
Development, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development under
Contract H-4308 at III-17)) (“Before 1975, seventy percent of subsidized family
housing was built in the central cities. By 1976, almost sixty percent was built in
the suburbs and by the end of the decade virtually all of family subsidized housing
was being built in the suburbs.”).
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generated resistance from central-city housing agencies and the
urban developers who could expect to build new affordable
104
projects.
In what would prove to be a significant setback for suburban
integration, the cities of Minneapolis and Saint Paul collaborated
105
to create the Family Housing Fund (the Fund) in 1980. This
entity quickly became a useful ally and an effective policy
instrument for those who believed that public resources should be
put to use by building affordable housing in low-opportunity
central-city neighborhoods. With large philanthropic and
governmental resources, the Fund aggressively promoted the
construction of subsidized housing in the core cities, effectively
pushing more government housing funds into the cities’ most
106
segregated neighborhoods.
In its first decade, the Fund focused on housing in the central
cities, pumping a reported 10,500 low-income units into
107
Minneapolis and Saint Paul. The organization eventually grew
into one of the largest regional players in affordable development,
and to this day it continues to contribute to projects across the
108
metro area. But a disproportionate share of its efforts are still
focused on the two central cities, and as shown in Figure 5 (“Table
1”), a disproportionate share of the units it helps finance are
109
located within segregated census tracts.

104. Id. at 32 (“When the [LIHTC] program began, central cities housing
officials, angry at the loss of low income housing funds to the suburbs during the
1970s, petitioned the legislature to create central city sub-allocators for LIHTC
funds.”).
105. See FAMILY HOUS. FUND, FAMILY HOUSING FUND ANNUAL REPORT: 2012
ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND FINANCIALS 3 (Dec. 2013), www.fhfund.org/wp-content
/uploads/2014/10/2012_Annual.pdf.
106. See generally Robert Franklin, $8.5 Million Grant Goes Toward Housing for
3,400 Families, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-Saint Paul), Apr. 26, 1998, 1988 WLNR
1643322; Ingrid Sundstrom, Financial Transaction Nets Housing Agencies $4.2 Million,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-Saint Paul), May 30, 1986, 1986 WLNR 1120819.
107. Robert Franklin, Housing Fund Turns to Suburbs: $7 Million McKnight Grant
to Help Provide More Living Units, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-Saint Paul), Feb. 26,
1991, 1991 WLNR 3707058.
108. See generally History, FAM. HOUSING FUND, http://www.fhfund.org/history/
(last visited Dec. 13, 2016).
109. See Figure 5 (“Table 1”).
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Figure 5.
And these figures, which only examine housing projects that
the Fund directly finances, underestimate the organization’s
regional influence. The Fund intertwines itself with the Twin Cities’
housing policy apparatus: its directors sit on the boards of a
number of regional projects and collaborations, and the
organization works closely with virtually every other major public,
private, and nonprofit entity in affordable housing construction
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110

and finance. Although the organization is today most frequently
111
described as a nonprofit, its public sector roots ensure that it
maintains unusually close ties with local governmental entities. For
example, its president of thirty-five years is a former deputy director
of the Minneapolis housing agency—Minneapolis Housing and
112
Redevelopment Authority. The Fund has also created subsidiaries
to participate more directly in housing development. These include
113
the Twin Cities Housing Development Corporation and, more
recently, the Twin Cities Community Land Bank (The Land
114
Bank).
The Land Bank, itself an increasingly important
participant in the housing scene, works with private banks to
acquire foreclosed properties for conversion into affordable
housing, mostly in distressed Minneapolis neighborhoods,
115
particularly in North Minneapolis.
The Met Council began to back away from the fair share
commitments of the Land Use Planning Act and Policy as a result
of pressure from two sides. On one, there were conservative
suburban politicians who characterized integration as social
engineering; on the other, there was an increasingly organized
housing community, clustered around powerful proponents of

110. See Staff and Board, FAM. HOUSING FUND, http://www.fhfund.org/staff
-board/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (indicating the wide variety of companies and
organizations with which staff and board members are involved).
111. FAM. HOUSING FUND, http://www.fhfund.org/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2016)
(“The Family Housing Fund is a nonprofit intermediary organization . . . .”).
112. See Frederick Melo, A Number of Long-Serving Nonprofit, Government Officials
Set to Retire, PIONEER PRESS (Minneapolis-Saint Paul) (June 27, 2015),
http://www.twincities.com/2015/06/27/a-number-of-long-serving-nonprofit
-government-officials-set-to-retire/ (noting that Fulton had served as president
since 1980 and had previously worked with other housing agencies).
113. The Twin Cities Housing Development Corporation was described upon
its creation in 1986 as “quasipublic” by the Star Tribune. Ingrid Sundstrom, Family
Housing Fund Now Developing Rental Units, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-Saint Paul),
Mar. 1, 1986, 1986 WLNR 1127165. However, today it bills itself on its website only
as a “nonprofit developer.” About, TWIN CITIES HOUSING DEV. CORP.,
http://www.tchdc.org/about (last visited Dec. 13, 2016).
CITIES
COMMUNITY
LAND
BANK,
114. About
Us,
TWIN
http://www.tcclandbank.org/about.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (noting that
the organization started its work in 2009).
115. The Land Bank provides maps of its projects. See Resources, TWIN CITIES
COMMUNITY LAND BANK, http://www.tcclandbank.org/maps.html (last visited Dec.
13, 2016).
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116

inner-city development like the Family Housing Fund. Housing
117
dollars returned to segregated neighborhoods. Much of the land
that had once been zoned to be inclusionary and multifamily in the
118
suburbs quietly reverted to large-lot, single-family home zoning.
In the end, the very effective fair share program was ended not only
by racially motivated white opposition from affluent suburbs, but
also by the changing priorities and self-interest of central-city
politicians and housing developers and the neglect of a disengaged
119
Met Council and liberal legislature.
The advent of a new federal program, the Low Income
Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), also helped accelerate resegregation
120
of the Twin Cities. Prior to 1986, federally supported housing
programs, known as HUD (United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development) programs, were closely regulated by civil
121
rights rules and pro-integrative court decisions. In 1986, HUD
programs were replaced by tax credits, which were administered by
the United States Department of the Treasury and subject to fewer
122
civil rights rules. This loosening of federal oversight gave the
central-city housing developers another opportunity to capture a
123
greater share of affordable development.
As Minnesota enabling legislation was created in 1986 to
administer LIHTC, the distribution system was designed to ensure
that a disproportionate share of these credits would be dedicated to
the central cities, effectively returning government-supported
116. See generally Edward Goetz, Karen Chapple & Barbara Lukermann,
Enabling Exclusion: The Retreat from Regional Fair Share Housing in the Implementation
of the Minnesota Land Use Planning Act, 22 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 213, 217–18 (2003).
117. See id. at 213–14.
118. Id. at 223–24.
119. Id.
120. See Meredith Rieth, Segregation Under the Guise of the Fair Housing Act:
Affirmatively Furthering Segregative (and Expensive) Housing Development, 33 LAW &
INEQ. 285, 300 (2015).
121. See generally NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., A BRIEF HISTORICAL
OVERVIEW OF AFFORDABLE RENTAL HOUSING (2015) (discussing the historical
involvement of the HUD and other federal programs in providing housing).
122. See id. at 7; see also Data Sets, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV,
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/lihtc.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2016)
(“Created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the LIHTC program gives state and
local LIHTC-allocating agencies the equivalent of nearly $8 billion in annual
budget authority to issue tax credits for the acquisition, rehabilitation, or new
construction of rental housing targeted to lower-income households.”).
123. NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., supra note 121, at 7.
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124

housing to segregated neighborhoods. Minneapolis and Saint
Paul both became “sub-allocators,” and the Met Council (with
input from the Minnesota Housing Finance Agency) was
125
empowered to set the cities’ minimum allotment of tax credits.
The Met Council chose to award the cities each a share that was far
126
in excess of their shares of regional population. Even beyond
that, credits were awarded by a competitive point system that relied
127
on calculated criteria. Accordingly, these criteria ensured that the
cities always received an even greater share than their guaranteed
128
minimum. In addition, these criteria frequently disadvantaged
proposals for projects in mostly white, growing city neighborhoods
129
or suburbs.
LIHTC is also been notable for drawing another group of wellfunded interests into the affordable housing world: for-profit
130
investors and intermediaries. In order to utilize tax credits,
housing managers and developers form single-purpose
131
partnerships with for-profit investors. The investors buy their way
into the partnership for the price of the tax credits, which are then
132
deducted from the investors’ annual tax bills. The entire process,
133
is facilitated by specialized attorneys and
called syndication,
134
financial professionals. The investors and syndicators have a
strong interest in preserving the LIHTC system but no economic

124. See Rieth, supra note 120, at 285, 300–03.
125. REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING POLICY IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note 31,
at 2.
126. Id. at 3 (“In 2012, about 25% of the region’s population and housing
units were located in Minneapolis and Saint Paul. However, more than twice this
share of the region’s subsidized housing was located there—59 percent of all
subsidized units and 53 percent of LIHTC units.”).
127. Id. at 20–24 (explaining the process through which points are allocated).
128. Id. at 20–21 (“State law currently guarantees that Minneapolis and St.
Paul each receive a share of tax credits significantly greater than their share of the
region’s population.”).
129. Id. at 23–26.
130. See id. at 20.
131. See generally id. at 22–23.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 24–25.
134. See id. at 25 (“[S]yndication drags a number of third parties into the
affordable housing market . . . . These include not only the private investors, but
specialized coordinators, or syndicators.”).
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interest whatsoever in pursuing genuine integrative affordable
135
housing goals.
Growing (and largely white) suburbs were always resistant to
136
building affordable housing, and when the central cities began to
137
recapture federal funding through LIHTC and other means,
suburban governments did not oppose their efforts. Nor was there
significant opposition at the state level. The Met Council, the
regional entity with the most power to ensure that housing
subsidies were put towards integrative ends, instead took an easier,
more politically palatable path and directed money into urban
communities where affordable development would meet no
138
opposition.
During the 1980s and 1990s, community development
organizations became more influential and more deeply
139
entrenched in metropolitan politics. The collaborative funding
structure of the tax credit gave rise to dozens of neighborhoodbased low-income development organizations that actively sought
to build housing in the areas they represented; those areas were
140
almost invariably depressed central-city communities. Because
voter turnout and political participation were low in these
neighborhoods, and there were few commercial or other interests
with the resources to compete politically, community developers

135. See id. (“[Syndicators] may have objectives that are at odds with the
housing objectives of the tax credit grant.”).
136. See OVERVIEW OF THE COUNCIL’S RESPONSE, supra note 87, at 10.
137. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
138. See REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING POLICY IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note
31, at 1 (“[P]otential projects in higher-opportunity suburban areas have gone
unfunded.”); see also id. at 3 (“Subsidized housing in the Twin Cities is highly
concentrated in the region’s two central cities. In 2012, about 25 percent of the
region’s population and housing units were located in Minneapolis and Saint
Paul. However, more than twice this share of the region’s subsidized housing was
located there—59 percent of all subsidized units and 53 percent of LIHTC
units.”).
139. See, e.g., METRO. CONSORTIUM OF CMTY. DEVELOPERS, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT
(2014),
http://www.mccdmn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014-MCCD-Annual
-Report -Final.pdf (discussing the formation of the Metropolitan Consortium of
Community Developers in 1989 and its path to becoming an influential
organization involved in metropolitan politics).
140. See, e.g., Membership, METROPOLITAN CONSORTIUM OF COMMUNITY
DEVELOPERS, http://www.mccdmn.org/membership/our-members/ (last visited
Dec. 13, 2016) (listing various community development organizations in
Minnesota).
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could easily build strong political constituencies.
These
neighborhood entities in turn built coalitions with banks, which
were required under the Community Reinvestment Act to show
142
investment activity in segregated neighborhoods. It was much
cheaper and easier for banks to donate or loan a few million dollars
to neighborhood housing developers than to actively pursue fair
lending practices. By funding community developers, a bank could
also generate strong allies who could be counted on to praise the
bank’s reinvestment policy and who would be unlikely to challenge
143
any potentially discriminatory lending.
The small neighborhood organizations, headed by and staffed
with local activists, collaborated closely with larger, wealthier
developers. The small neighborhood organizations, sometimes with
nonwhite leadership, were politically attractive and wielded
outsized influence, so they could effectively appeal for subsidies for
144
“their” projects. In reality, however, the design and construction
of these projects were almost always beyond the financial resources
and technical expertise of the tiny neighborhood group and
instead were conducted almost entirely by a larger partner—usually
145
a well-established nonprofit or for-profit developer.
141. See REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING POLICY IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note
31, at 12 (“[W]hile developing in a particular neighborhood may be expensive, a
community development corporation based in that neighborhood creates a
political constituency for development activity focused in that neighborhood.”).
142. See generally OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENTS FACT SHEET (2014), https://www.occ.gov/topics/community-affairs
/publications/fact-sheets/fact-sheet-cra-loans.pdf
[hereinafter
COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENTS FACT SHEET] (discussing what constitutes “community
development” for banks seeking to comply with the Community Reinvestment
Act); see also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, LOW-INCOME HOUSING
TAX CREDITS: AFFORDABLE HOUSING INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR BANKS 7
(2014),
https://www.occ.gov/topics/community-affairs/publications/insights
/insights-low-income-housing-tax-credits.pdf [hereinafter LOW-INCOME HOUSING
TAX CREDITS] (“An important incentive for banks investing in LIHTCs is the
[Community Reinvestment Act] consideration they may receive for making these
investments.”).
143. See LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDITS, supra note 142, at 9
(“Participating in LIHTC projects provides banks with opportunities to expand
existing customer relationships and to develop new customer relationships.”).
144. See generally COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENTS FACT SHEET, supra note 142
(considering ways in which banks can work with community organizations in order
to comply with the Community Reinvestment Act).
145. REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING POLICY IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note 31,
at 13 (“[L]arge[r] developers are able to independently conduct most
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This rising nexus of political and economic forces contributed
even further to the concentration of affordable housing in the
146
central cities. With favorable political tailwinds in segregated
neighborhoods, large firms are less sensitive to costs, leading to
147
major projects with ballooning budgets. By comparison, because
148
opposition to suburban affordable housing is greater, developers
face more resistance in the legal and political spheres, and, in any
149
case, proportionately fewer dollars are available. Although this
has resulted in more cost-effective construction in the suburbs, it is
unsurprising that many developers have little interest in an
integrative model that offers fewer profits in exchange for harder
work.
Affordable development sometimes contributes to a feedback
loop of segregation, where a concentration of low-income housing
in a neighborhood accelerates abandonment and disinvestment,
which in turn attracts yet more attention from community
developers and makes affordable development even easier to
150
pursue. For example, in the aftermath of the 2008 recession,
North Minneapolis, which had for years been a high priority for
community development, was one of the areas in the state hit
development, while neighborhood groups are forced to partner with builders,
architects, financiers, and each other.”).
146. Bloomberg News, Building Affordable Housing Is Hardly Affordable, FIN. AND
COM.
(July
26,
2016,
12:28
PM),
http://finance-commerce.com
/2016/07/building-affordable-housing-is-hardly-affordable/.
147. See REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING POLICY IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note
31, at 13 (“In terms of raw spending and revenue, the activities of the large
members far outstrip those of the smaller members.”); see also id. at 32 tbl.A.1
(showing determinants of per unit cost of affordable housing projects).
148. See generally Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys.
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (upholding the feasibility of bringing a
disparate-impact claim in a dispute where a community-based non-profit
challenged “where housing for low-income persons should be constructed in
Dallas, Texas—that is, whether the housing should be built in the inner city or in
the suburbs”); Michael Hoban, Many Suburbs Dodging Issue of Affordable Housing,
URBANLAND (May 31, 2016), http://urbanland.uli.org/development-business
/many-u-s-suburbs-dodging-issue-affordable-housing-construction/.
149. Christina Hoag, Low-Income Housing Funds Are Drying Up All Over America,
TAKE PART (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.takepart.com/article/2015/01/13
/low-income-housing.
150. Frederick Melo, U Professor Takes a Contrary View on Affordable Housing
Development, PIONEER PRESS (Minneapolis-Saint Paul) (Feb. 23, 2014),
http://www.twincities.com/2014/02/23/u-professor-takes-a-contrary-view-on
-affordable-housing-development/.
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151

hardest by the foreclosure crisis. Ironically, the area has become
the epicenter of several major local affordable projects and
initiatives, as foreclosed properties in distressed neighborhoods are
cheap to acquire, and banks have proven more than willing to turn
152
them over to developers and land banks at a discount. At times,
developers in these areas seem to have taken it upon themselves to
convert every abandoned structure into new, permanent lowincome housing. While this continual evolution of the housing
stock keeps developers and financial professionals busy, it
manifestly does not offer residents of distressed neighborhoods
new housing opportunities in more affluent areas, promote racial
integration, or promote economic integration.
Together, the entities involved in affordable development
form a web of tightly interconnected government agencies,
nonprofits, private developers, banks, and investors, which are all
dependent upon a profitable model of building low-income
housing in poor central-city neighborhoods. This collection of
interests has coalesced into a dominant force in affordable housing
in the Twin Cities. Collectively they are hereafter referred to as the
poverty housing industry, or PHI.
B.

The Creation of the Poverty Education Complex (PEC)

The rise of the PHI in the early 1990s was accompanied by a
parallel movement in education policy. As Twin Cities
neighborhoods resegregated, so did the schools. This triggered a
decline in test scores, which was used by self-styled “school
reformers” as evidence of the failure of central-city public
education. School reformers argued that Minnesotans needed
more “choice” in education: both the ability to choose which public
school district to attend and also the option to choose between

151. See, e.g., ANDRIANA ABORIETES & ROSE CARR, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
MINNEAPOLIS, WEATHERING THE STORM: COMMUNITY DEVELOPERS IN MINNESOTA FACE
THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS (2009), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications
/community-dividend/weathering-the-storm-community-developers-in-minnesota
-face-the-foreclosure-crisis (“In the hardest-hit parts of the two cities—North
Minneapolis and St. Paul’s East Side neighborhoods—foreclosures are dismantling
neighborhood revitalization efforts . . . .”).
152. See, e.g., Jessica Mador, Saving Foreclosed Homes in North Minneapolis, MPR
NEWS (Dec. 7, 2009), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2009/12/07/reclaiming
-foreclosed-homes-in-north-minneapolis.
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153

traditional public and independent charter schools.
They
asserted that charter schools and choice would create a competitive
154
race to the top and greater racial integration. Similar to what
happened in the affordable housing sector, a lucrative private
education sector quickly established itself, consisting of advocacy
groups, charter research organizations, charter schools, and
charter support companies. This network of organizations is
hereafter collectively referred to as the poverty education complex,
or PEC.
Enhancing school integration efforts was one of the initial
arguments made in support of creating open enrollment and
charter schools, the two primary school choice measures in
155
Minnesota. However, both programs eventually evolved to share
many of the same strategies and results that southern
segregationists used to elude the mandates of Brown v. Board of
156
Tellingly, charter proponents have completely
Education.
abandoned any effort to defend the programs on the basis of
integrative outcomes.
Historically, most charters were predominantly nonwhite,
157
poor, and located in the central cities. In more recent years,

153.
154.

See FAILED PROMISES, supra note 44, at 1.
See generally JOE NATHAN, CHARTER SCHOOLS: CREATING HOPE AND
OPPORTUNITY FOR AMERICAN EDUCATION (1996) (providing an overview of the
charter school movement); TED KOLDERIE, CREATING THE CAPACITY FOR CHANGE:
HOW AND WHY GOVERNORS AND LEGISLATURES ARE OPENING A NEW-SCHOOLS SECTOR
IN PUBLIC EDUCATION (2004), http://www.educationevolving.org/pdf/Creating
-Capacity-for-Change-Summary.pdf (explaining that public education has adapted
to racial integration).
155. See CITIZEN’S LEAGUE, CHARTERED SCHOOLS = CHOICES FOR EDUCATORS +
QUALITY FOR ALL STUDENTS, at I (1988), https://citizensleague.org/wp-content
/uploads/2013/05/424.Report.Chartered-Schools-Choices-for-Education-Qualityfor-All-Students.pdf (“Minneapolis and St. Paul have learned that school
desegregation based solely on numbers and transportation produces neither
sufficient integration nor assured access to quality education. We need a new
approach to multicultural education that values quality as much as it does quotas,
and that moves us closer to real integration as a community.”). The Citizen’s
League report was one of the first detailed proposals for charter schools in the
United States.
156. See 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
157. Myron Orfield & Thomas Luce, Charters, Choice, and the Constitution, 2014
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 377, 389–90 (2014), http://school-diversity.org/pdf
/13_Orfield.pdf (explaining that the percentage of charters which are
predominantly nonwhite has been high for most years since the mid-1990s).
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much of the growth in charter enrollments has been in nearly allwhite schools that appear in suburban areas where the public
schools are becoming racially diverse—much like segregation
academies in the Deep South.
White or nonwhite, charter schools in the Twin Cities remain
158
very segregated. Nearly 90% of black students at charters attend a
segregated school, as do about 80% of Hispanic and Asian159
American students.
Meanwhile, over 70% of white charter
160
attendees attend a white-segregated school. In most cases, these
numbers continue to rise. The vast majority of charters, and
especially nonwhite segregated schools, have produced poor
student performance, even after controlling for their high poverty
161
rates.
Charters have been remarkably open about their attempts to
create single-race enclaves, particularly in the central cities. While
legally mandated segregation is forbidden, charters have found an
effective workaround, one that skirts as close as possible to the
enforced separation of the Jim Crow era—a large number of
charters are culturally-focused and overwhelmingly composed of a
single racial group, ensuring that students from any other group
162
will remain isolated. The strategy has proven highly effective at
maintaining racial lines, as the degree of segregation at charters is
163
much higher than at traditional public schools. While even
segregated traditional schools typically include a small minority of
diverse students, segregated charters frequently enroll hundreds of
students from one ethnic group, often without a single
164
exception. The public school system, forced to compete with
charters for students and funds, is now slowly following suit,
dividing diverse student bodies into separate schools, each
165
explicitly targeted at a separate racial group.
158. INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, CHARTER SCHOOLS IN THE TWIN CITIES:
2013 UPDATE 1 (2013) [hereinafter CHARTER SCHOOLS IN THE TWIN CITIES] (“This
update . . . shows that charters are still much more likely to be segregated than
their traditional counterparts.”).
159. Id. at 5–6
160. Id. at 6.
161. Id. at 8–10.
162. FAILED PROMISES, supra note 44, at 39.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 39–40.
165. Beth Hawkins & Cynthia Boyd, The Rise of Voluntarily Segregated Schools:
(Nov.
19,
2008),
New
Trend,
Familiar
Problems,
MINNPOST

2017]

WHY ARE THE TWIN CITIES SO SEGREGATED?

35

Similarly, the early years of open enrollment were dominated
166
by race-neutral student movements. But in recent years, growing
numbers of white students are using the program to move from
racially integrated schools (or schools in racial transition) to much
167
less racially diverse schools —a pattern closely resembling
optional school boundaries, which were outlawed by the Supreme
168
Court in the 1970s. One key political support for the PEC came
in the late 1990s, when the Minnesota Attorney General’s office
sharply changed its interpretation of the meaning of the federal
equal protection clause. While civil rights stalwart John R. Tunheim
was Chief Deputy Attorney General of Minnesota, elected state and
local officials had been told they had broad discretion to integrate
169
local schools. After Tunheim left to become a federal judge, the
Attorney General’s office issued an opinion asserting that, without
proof of discriminatory conduct, the integration plans it had
previously encouraged were likely to be found illegal, in part
because they included race-conscious remedies that could be found
170
to discriminate against whites. The opinion defended segregated
schools, arguing that “Brown v. Board of Education did not stand for
the proposition that racially segregated schools, without more, are
171
inherently unequal.” The new rule, rather than being based in
any existing law, was instead rooted in the office’s speculative

https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2008/11/rise-voluntarily-segregated
-schools-new-trend-familiar-problems.
166. INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, OPEN ENROLLMENT AND RACIAL
SEGREGATION
IN
THE
TWIN
CITIES:
2000–2010,
at
7
(2013),
http://www1.law.umn.edu/uploads/30/c7/30c7d1fd89a6b132c81b36b37a79e9e1
/Open-Enrollment-and-Racial-Segregation-Final.pdf (explaining the transition
from race neutral moves to more integrative or segregative moves).
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Milliken
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1 (1971).
169. STATE OF MINN. DEP’T OF CHILDREN, FAMILIES & LEARNING, STATEMENT OF
NEED AND REASONABLENESS, IN THE MATTER OF PROPOSED RULES RELATING TO
DESEGREGATION: MINNESOTA RULES CHAPTER 3535 (3535.0100 to 3535.0180) 7
(1998), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/archive/sonar/sonar-02791.pdf [hereinafter
FAMILIES & LEARNING] (“The present rule assumes that there should be a certain
racial balance, and requires districts to propose desegregation plans when that
balance has been exceeded.”).
170. See id.
171. See id. at 169.
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assumption that the U.S. Supreme Court would soon declare
172
almost all proactive integrative strategies unconstitutional.
But charter schools and districts using the open enrollment
program did not even have to abide by this new, greatly weakened
integration rule. The new rule exempted charters and open
enrollment from its requirements, making it nearly impossible for
173
local schools to effectively integrate. In the case of charters, this
was achieved by a provision of the law bizarrely declaring that they
are not considered “schools” for the purpose of the integration
174
rule. After the effective destruction of the integration rule, school
175
which in turn accelerated housing
segregation skyrocketed,
segregation and raised the profile of the community developers in
the PHI.
Both the PHI and the PEC sought to exploit huge government
programs in the areas of housing and education to create highly
salaried administrative positions and private wealth. But unlike
most powerful corporate interest groups, the PHI and the PEC
tended to be active supporters of Democratic politicians. In part,
this is out of necessity: both networks are heavily active within the
Democratically-controlled central cities.
As the PHI and PEC grew more influential and the Met
Council stopped enforcing Policy 39, the region’s heretofore tiny
black ghetto exploded in size, growing at the fourth fastest rate in
176
the nation during the 1980s. Meanwhile, Minneapolis’s schools
177
went from 34% nonwhite to 59% nonwhite in just twelve years.

172. Nothing of the sort ever happened; indeed, the Supreme Court has gone
on to affirm the permissibility of integration efforts like those previously used in
Minnesota. Id. at 20–21 (“[T]here is a serious question whether the imposition of
a strict numerical definition of segregation, followed by the use of a race-based
remedy, such as student assignments based solely on race, or racial quotas at
schools, would be sustained.”).
173. See generally Margaret C. Hobday, Geneva Finn & Myron Orfield, A Missed
Opportunity: Minnesota’s Failed Experiment with Choice-Based Integration, 35 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 948 (2009).
174. MINN. R. 3535.0110 subp. 8 (A) (“For purposes of parts 3535.0160 to
3535.0180 only, school does not mean . . . charter schools under Minnesota
Statutes, chapter 124E.”).
175. Hobday, Finn & Orfield, supra note 173.
176. Paul A. Jargowsky, Ghetto Poverty Among Blacks in the 1980s, 13 J. OF POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 288, 293 (1994).
177. ORFIELD, supra note 67, at 43.
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IV. RESISTANCE
These regressive trends did not go unnoticed or unopposed.
Unfortunately, efforts to reverse or slow the process of
resegregation have thus far all been met with limited success,
quickly foundering against suburban pushback or, more recently,
the increasing influence of entrenched housing and education
interests.
In 1992, fair housing advocates sued the Met Council and the
city of Minneapolis over their segregated affordable housing
178
After several years, the defendants settled in what
policies.
179
became known as the Hollman Consent Decree, using the lawsuit
as an opportunity to expand suburban affordable housing. Several
heavily-segregated public housing projects in North Minneapolis
would be demolished, and replacement units would be constructed
in the suburbs. Programs to encourage greater racial and economic
integration were also instituted; for instance, public housing
residents would also be given special “mobility vouchers” to help
180
them find new housing.
These efforts were no match for the political, social, and
economic forces opposing integration. Over two hundred families
181
applied for mobility vouchers. But 71.9% of these applicants were
subsequently unable to find a qualifying lease within the time
182
frame allowed and thus were prevented from relocating. This
strongly indicated that the unavailability of accessible affordable
housing was a major culprit in continuing residential segregation.
But the PHI, rather than regarding this disappointing
outcome as a symptom of entrenched housing discrimination,
178. See id. at 20; see also EDWARD GOETZ, CTR. FOR URBAN & REG’L AFFAIRS,
UNIV. OF MINN., HOLLMAN V. CISNEROS: DECONCENTRATING POVERTY IN MINNEAPOLIS,
REPORT NO. 1: POLICY CONTEXT AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON HOUSING DISPERSAL 1
(2002), http://www.housinglink.org/Files/Hollman-Compilation.pdf [hereinafter
REPORT NO. 1].
179. See EDWARD GOETZ, CTR. FOR URBAN & REG’L AFFAIRS, UNIV. OF MINN.,
HOLLMAN V. CISNEROS: DECONCENTRATING POVERTY IN MINNEAPOLIS, REPORT NO. 2:
PLANNING
FOR
NORTH
SIDE
REDEVELOPMENT
1
(2002),
http://www.housinglink.org/Files/Hollman-Compilation.pdf.
180. See GOETZ, REPORT NO. 1, supra note 178, at 35.
181. EDWARD GOETZ, CTR. FOR URBAN & REG’L AFFAIRS, UNIV. OF MINN.,
HOLLMAN V. CISNEROS: DECONCENTRATING POVERTY IN MINNEAPOLIS, REPORT NO. 8:
POLICY CONTEXT AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON HOUSING DISPERSAL 35 (2002),
http://www.housinglink.org/Files/Hollman-Compilation.pdf.
182. Id.
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instead interpreted it as an indication that fair housing is unviable
and undesirable. To evaluate the outcome of the lawsuit, the
Family Housing Fund commissioned a study that characterized
efforts to provide more suburban housing choices as “dispersal” or
183
“deconcentration.” The evaluation approached the public debate
over integration narrowly, focusing heavily on the views of a small
number of mostly-white housing activists and a local community of
184
non-English-speaking Asian immigrants. It did not acknowledge
the political forces, including those within the black community,
that were continuing to fight to prevent segregation and preserve
integrated schools.
The fight for integration was also taking place within the
legislature. A political coalition of the cities and older suburbs
urged a return to the Met Council’s Policy 39 and proposed a bill
that would strongly condition state funding on a city’s willingness
185
to provide a fair share of low-income housing. But this bill was
opposed by conservative suburban politicians, some of whom were
quite explicit about their desire to maintain the suburbs as havens
186
for the wealthy. The bill passed both houses but was ultimately
187
vetoed by Republican governor Arne Carlson.
After protracted political battles, a compromise measure
emerged in its place: a new law that dropped carrot-and-stick tactics
for an approach that was “all carrot,” so to speak. Suburban
communities would voluntarily negotiate housing goals with the
Met Council, and strong housing performance would be rewarded
with increased funding, which would come from one of several
183. See GOETZ, REPORT NO. 1, supra note 178, at 61. This is the same study that
demonstrated that most families seeking relocation were unable to find a
qualifying lease.
184. See EDWARD GOETZ, CTR. FOR URBAN & REG’L AFFAIRS, UNIV. OF MINN.,
HOLLMAN V. CISNEROS: DECONCENTRATING POVERTY IN MINNEAPOLIS, REPORT NO. 6:
EXPERIENCE
OF
DISPERSED
FAMILIES
(2002),
THE
http://www.housinglink.org/Files/Hollman-Compilation.pdf.
185. See H.F. 2171, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1994), https://www.revisor
.mn.gov/laws/?year=1994&type=0&doctype=Chapter&id=594&format=pdf.
186. Dane Smith, House OKs Penalties for Suburbs Lacking Low-Cost Housing, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis-Saint Paul), Apr. 30, 1993, 1993 WLNR 3952597 (quoting state
representatives Eileen Tompkins and Todd H. Van Dellen) (“People moved to
Apple Valley for the good life . . . . We’re not going to sit here and let [the housing
bill] ruin our community . . . . The suburbs exist for a reason . . . . They give
people something to shoot for.”).
187. H.R. Journal, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. 8807–08 (Minn. 1994),
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/archive/vetoes/1994veto_ch594.pdf.
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188

newly created accounts. Although this new law did not diminish
the fair share and civil rights obligations already enshrined in
Minnesota law, it created little additional pressure for cities to
integrate, conditioning no preexisting funding on their
189
190
compliance. This was called the Livable Communities Act.
Simultaneously, pressure for integration was mounting at the
grassroots level. In 1995, the NAACP sued the state of Minnesota,
alleging that segregation in Minneapolis had led to
191
unconstitutionally inadequate city schools. The lawsuit was the
subject of detailed press coverage. These events coincided with
crowded, emotional school board meetings in which hundreds of
black parents from North Minneapolis forcefully opposed the city’s
192
effort to return to segregated neighborhood schools. Much of the
testimony centered on the injustice of Minneapolis’s highly
segregated pattern of neighborhood development and affordable
193
housing construction.
Suburban school boards, frightened by the prospect of
mandated busing, proposed a negotiated resolution to the crisis.
But this proposal collapsed when black community leaders noted
that school integration without busing would require the creation
of low-income housing in the wealthy suburbs—something
194
suburban communities were unwilling to provide. The Orono
school superintendent, for instance, argued that, “The issue isn’t as
simple as providing low-cost housing.” He instead suggested that
195
the city focus on “creating jobs.” As the Star Tribune pointed out
at the time, the suburbs failed “to put anything concrete on the
188. Kristine Nelson Fuge, Exclusionary Zoning: Keeping People in Their Wrongful
Places or a Valid Exercise of Local Control?, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 148, 163–66
(1996).
189. See MINN. STAT. § 473.25 (2016) (listing the requirements of the program,
none of which include conditioning preexisting funding on compliance).
190. Metropolitan Livable Communities Act of 1995, ch. 255, art. 1, § 1, 1995
Minn. Laws 2592, 2593–600 (codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 473.25–255 (2016)).
191. See generally Cynthia Boyd & Beth Hawkins, School Integration Through the
(Nov.
17,
2008),
Years,
MINNPOST
https://www.minnpost.com/infodoc/2008/11/school-integration-through-years.
192. See generally Jon Hilson, NAACP Sues Minnesota To Defend Desegregation, THE
MILITANT (Oct. 16, 1995), http://www.themilitant.com/1995/5938/5938_3.html
(discussing community resistance to desegregated school model).
193. See id.
194. Mike Kaszuba, Suburban Housing Costs Keep Poor Away, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis-Saint Paul), Aug. 4, 1996, 1996 WLNR 5051342.
195. Id.
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table,” which “[left] them open to criticism that they are motivated
196
more by fear of a court ruling than good intentions.”
Developments at the regional level were accompanied by a
major push for more affordable housing within the central cities
themselves, particularly Minneapolis. Throughout the 1990s,
housing costs had been a topic of increasing importance in
Minneapolis politics, as projections showed that within a few years
even middle-class families would struggle to find affordable
197
residences. By 1994, this had led to the emergence of a highprofile grassroots campaign for affordability, which ceaselessly
lobbied the city government for massive new investments in
housing. The centerpiece and primary objective of this campaign
was the creation of a Minneapolis Affordable Housing Trust Fund,
198
which would build thousands of affordable units within the city.
Initially, the campaign included many civil rights advocates; when
the City Council finally created a task force to address the issue, it
199
placed john powell, a noted civil rights researcher, at its head.
But political opposition to integration from state and regional
government, as well as reluctance by the city to whole-heartedly
address the affordability issue, created a problem: without
participation by the Minneapolis suburbs, any attempt to provide
huge amounts of cheap housing in the city itself would inevitably
intensify segregation. This question divided housing activists.
Nonetheless, absent any commitment from the state or Met
Council to support integration, Minneapolis was incapable of
resolving the problem on its own.
Meanwhile, the concerns raised by civil rights advocates did
little to stop the efforts to construct ever-more affordable housing
in Minneapolis. In 2001, these efforts culminated in the election of
196.
197.

Id.
See BARBARA J. RONNINGEN, MINN. STATE DEMOGRAPHIC CTR., RENTAL
HOUSING
BECOMES
MORE
AFFORDABLE
IN
THE
1990S
(2003),
https://www.mn.gov/admin/assets/Rental-housing-becomes-more-affordable-in
-the-1990s-msdc-sept2003_tcm36-76775.pdf (providing an overview of housing
costs in the 1990s); Proportion of Households Burdened by Housing Costs, Minnesota,
MINN. 2020 (Jan. 2013), http://www.mn2020.org/assets/uploads/article/Jan2013
_housing_graphs.pdf (providing graphs depicting housing costs in the 1990s).
198. See CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS AFFORDABLE HOUSING
TRUST
FUND
3
(2013),
http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/www/groups
/public/@cped/documents/webcontent/wcms1p-105333.pdf.
199. See Kevin Diaz, Task Force Lays Out Aggressive Plan for Affordable Minneapolis
Housing, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-Saint Paul), June 24, 1999, 1999 WLNR 6445395.
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R.T. Rybak as mayor, a close ally of the PHI and PEC. Rybak
campaigned heavily on the affordable housing issue, calling it his
“top priority” and promising to erect an enormous “housing
thermometer” to measure progress towards construction goals in
200
front of City Hall. Under Rybak, the city finally created the long201
discussed Affordable Housing Trust Fund (AHTF). In its first
decade of operation, the AHTF would pour over $73 million into
affordable development, resulting in the creation of over 6000
202
As is the case with nearly all of
units in Minneapolis.
Minneapolis’s affordable units, the vast majority of these are
203
located in segregated, distressed neighborhoods.
The AHTF replicated in microcosm a simple dynamic that was
occurring throughout Minneapolis and Saint Paul. Although there
was considerable political pressure to build affordable units in the
metropolitan area, and the PHI provided a robust institutional
framework for doing so, the state and Met Council were refusing to
204
ensure that the suburbs received their fair share of housing. As a
result, all of the effort and resources for affordable housing found
themselves focused in the neighborhoods of least resistance: the
most racially-isolated, lowest-income regions of the two central
cities.
The NAACP’s civil rights efforts ran up against the same
problem. Its victory in obtaining the 1995 Hollman Consent
Decree, under which Minneapolis was obligated to raze segregated
housing projects in North Minneapolis, was reversed when the
205
suburbs failed to construct promised replacement units. The
200. Steve Brandt, Rybak’s Top Issue, Housing, Gets the Spotlight, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis-Saint Paul), Apr. 7, 2002, 2002 WLNR 12194576.
201. See CTR. FOR CMTY. CHANGE, MINNEAPOLIS APPROVES INCREASED FUNDING
FOR ITS AFFORDABLE HOUSING TRUST FUND (2014), http://housingtrustfundproject
.org/minneapolis-approves-increased-funding-for-its-affordable-housing-trust
-fund/.
202. Justin Miller, Minneapolis Renters Face Huge Affordable-Housing Shortage,
(Jan.
14,
2014),
https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy
MINNPOST
/2014/01/minneapolis-renters-face-huge-affordable-housing-shortage.
203. See CMTY. PLANNING & ECON. DEV., CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, CITY OF
MINNEAPOLIS AFFORDABLE HOUSING TRUST FUND 2002–2012, at 7 (2013),
http://www.minneapolismn.gov/www/groups/public/@cped/documents
/webcontent/wcms1p-105333.pdf.
204. See Semuels, supra note 4.
205. See generally Ciara Carolyn Torres, Housing in the Heartland: An
Examination of the Hollman v. Cisneros Consent Decree, the Politics of Racial
Concentration and the Possibilities Offered by Democratic Experimentalism, 17 NAT’L
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intransigence of suburban and regional governments had created
the unenviable choice between public housing in the cities and no
public housing at all, and the community split over whether to
206
cancel the demolitions it had formerly requested.
Jesse Ventura’s Met Council, first appointed in 1998, provided
a valuable assist in the push to massively increase affordable centralcity housing construction. One of its most important tasks was to
207
implement the Livable Communities Act (LCA). Though the
LCA represented a compromise measure, lacking the enforcement
mechanisms of previous approaches, a number of civil rights
advocates were still optimistic that it could trigger a transformation
of the suburbs, reducing segregation in the region. In 2002, the
law’s sponsor told the Star Tribune it was accomplishing its goals
and “ha[d] helped change the debate on affordable housing in
208
most suburbs from ‘whether’ to ‘how.’”
But in a repudiation of the fair housing proponents who
supported the passage of the act, Ventura’s Met Council used the
LCA to give the highest affordable housing goals to the deeply
segregated central cities and low-income, rapidly segregating
209
suburbs. By 2007, local media was acknowledging that the LCA
had “fallen far short” of meeting its affordable unit targets, with a
number of suburban communities producing a tiny fraction of
210
their negotiated goals.
Ventura’s Met Council had cynically used a law passed to open
up whiter suburbs for affordable housing to increase the affordable
housing shares of segregated neighborhoods. This reversal
effectively undermined the political coalition for metropolitan

BLACK L.J. 98 (2003) (providing an extensive overview of the history and aftermath
of the Hollman Consent Decree).
206. Kevin Diaz, MCDA Calls Affordable Housing Report ‘Problematic,’ STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis-Saint Paul), Aug. 17, 1999, 1999 WLNR 6451578.
207. Metropolitan Livable Communities Act of 1995, ch. 255, art. 1, § 1, 1995
Minn. Laws 2592, 2593–600 (codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 473.25–255 (2016)).
208. Steve Brandt, Affordable Housing: Where Battle Lines—and Solutions—Are
Being Drawn, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-Saint Paul) (Jan. 20, 2002), 2002 WLNR
12172593.
209. The Met Council does not maintain a public list of Livable Communities
Act per-community housing goals. The goals are on file at the Institute of
Metropolitan Opportunity.
210. Scott Neal, Editorial: Metro Failing to Meet Housing Goals, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis-Saint
Paul)
(July
17,
2007),
http://edenprairieweblogs.org/scottneal/post/1062/.
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reform that had existed between the central cities and older
suburbs during the 1990s.
Previous Met Councils had used lawsuits as a fulcrum on which
to leverage significant fair housing and civil rights reforms, like
desegregating schools and integrating neighborhoods. But when
Ventura’s Met Council was sued to enforce the fair share
requirement of the Land Use Planning Act, it reacted with hostility,
hiring one of the region’s best corporate law firms to defeat the
211
under-resourced civil rights advocates.
During the next several years, Minneapolis and Saint Paul
would add more units of subsidized, very low-income housing than
would be built in all the suburbs combined. Between 2002 and
2011, the region produced 2249 new, very affordable units
212
(affordable to those earning 30% of the metro median income).
Ninety-two percent of these units were produced in the central
213
cities, which have 23% of the region’s population. In other
words, the central cities received four times their fair share of very
low-income units. Virtually all of these units were located near
segregated or re-segregating schools. Of the 7253 new and
preserved very affordable units from this period, 74% were in the
214
central cities—over three times their fair share.
Faced with the undeniable failure of the LCA to accomplish its
original aims, the Met Council, rather than restoring its previous,
more successful policies, abandoned any pretense of fighting
segregation. The Met Council’s own documents captured an
obvious change in priorities. As late as 1996, its Regional Blueprint
discussed the stalled progress towards suburban housing
integration, noting with concern that the situation had not
215
improved in over a decade. But by 2004, even this vestigial
216
That year’s Regional
anxiety over civil rights had vanished.
Development Framework only noted that “[t]he region will, of
course, need much more housing in the next 30 years” and

211. All. for Metro. Stability v. Metro. Council, No. C7-02-007774, 2003 WL
25485305 (D. Minn. 2003).
212. Data on regional housing production were obtained from resources
maintained by HousingLink, including its annual reports; the most recent report
is available at http://www.housinglink.org/Files/Housing_Counts_2002_2013.pdf.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See METRO. COUNCIL, REGIONAL BLUEPRINT 59 (1996).
216. METRO. COUNCIL, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK 13 (2004).
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emphasizes the importance of “public-private partnerships” in
217
expanding housing supply.
218
In 2010, the Council negotiated a new set of LCA goals.
From a civil rights perspective, the results were disastrous: the
housing goals for exurban communities dropped by 42%, and the
219
goals for predominately white communities dropped by 63%. But
220
the goals for the two central cities increased by 43%.
Rather than acknowledging its own drifting priorities, the
Council now claims, in a bold rewrite of history, that fair housing
efforts were scuttled as part of a premeditated policy change. Its
2014 Housing Policy Plan ambiguously states that “actions in 1998
and 1999 eliminated [the Policy 39 fair share plan] from the
221
metropolitan development guide.” But the Council has been
unable to provide any record of such actions, and, under pressure
to explain its odd assertion, has finally suggested that this landmark
fair housing policy was eliminated by implication, after years of
222
nonenforcement. In other words, the Met Council, once an
agency deeply concerned with the problem of regional segregation,
now claims that its most important civil rights tool has simply
223
atrophied away due to years of nonuse.
Two decades of battles on behalf of integration have painted a
224
gloomy picture of life in poor Twin Cities neighborhoods. But

217. Id.
218. See Housing Preservation Project, Met Council Establishes Two Sets of
Housing Goals for Cities Starting in 2011, TCHOUSINGPOLICY.ORG (2011),
http://www.tchousingpolicy.org/act_locally/index.php?strWebAction=article
_print&intArticleID=618; see also METRO. COUNCIL, METROSTATS 8 (2011),
http://www.tchousingpolicy.org/_uls/resources/downloads/2011_2.11
_AffordableHousing_MS2010.pdf (discussing the “2010 LCA housing goals” and
the shortfalls in reaching these goals).
219. See METRO. COUNCIL, 2010 LIVABLE COMMUNITIES ACT (LCA) GOALS
(2010) (on file with author). See generally METRO. COUNCIL, METROSTATS, supra
note 218 (providing data regarding Affordable Housing Production in the Twin
Cities Region and looking at planning and goals in central cities, developed
suburbs, developing suburbs, rural centers, rural areas, and the metro area).
220. Figures generated by comparing the original 1995 goals to the 2010
goals. See IMO MEMORANDUM, supra note 52, at 19–20 (graphically illustrating the
affordable housing goals for the Livable Communities Act between 1996 and
2010).
221. HOUSING POLICY PLAN, supra note 86, at 18.
222. IMO MEMORANDUM, supra note 52, at 32.
223. Id. at 32–33.
224. REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note 31, at 1.
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the Met Council, it seems, subscribes to a different vision of
housing disparities—a vision also favored by affordable housing
225
In this view, the defining problem of housing
developers.
inequality is simply a shortage of units, and low-income minorities
no more want to live in the suburbs than they are missed by the
226
affluent whites already there. The solution is simple and never
changes: more money is needed to build more units, wherever
space for them can be found.
This viewpoint, characteristic of the PHI, now dominates
housing policy, with real consequences for Twin Cities residents.
The share of affordable housing in higher-income white suburbs
227
has declined to the lowest percentage since the 1970s.
Meanwhile, unprecedented concentrations of subsidized housing,
developed at heavy expense, is being targeted for locations near
transit lines in poor neighborhoods. This land is potentially
valuable and, if used for commercial or market-rate development,
could have jumpstarted the recovery of those neighborhoods. Even
228
though most unfilled entry-level jobs are now in the suburbs, often
229
without transit access, the PHI continues to assert that affordable
housing must be close to transit hubs and the central business
districts, which serve as the region’s largest clusters of highly-skilled
230
jobs.
Research shows that low-income housing tenants in growing
suburbs are more likely to be employed at better jobs, with their
children more likely to be doing better in higher-performing
231
schools. More than 60% of all nonwhite residents of the Twin
Cities and 40% of nonwhite residents of subsidized housing live in

225. IMO MEMORANDUM, supra note 52, at 13.
226. See id.
227. Semuels, supra note 54.
228. Bruce Katz & Katherine Allen, Help Wanted: Connecting Inner-City Job
Seekers with Suburban Jobs, 17 BROOKINGS REV. 31, 32 (1999),
http://www.nsl.ethz.ch/displus/140/docs/bkatz.pdf.
229. See Adie Tomer, Transit Access and Zero-Vehicle Households, METROPOLITAN
POL’Y PROGRAM AT BROOKINGS 6 (2011), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content
/uploads/2016/06/0818_transportation_tomer.pdf
(stating
that
transit
accessibility rates in major cities are nearly double that of suburban areas).
230. Katz & Allen, supra note 228, at 33.
231. Brett Theodos, Claudia Coulton & Amos Budde, Getting to Better
Performing Schools: The Role of Residential Mobility in School Attainment in Low-Income
Neighborhoods, 16 CITYSCAPE 10 (2014).
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232

the suburbs, and subsidized housing units in the suburbs have the
233
region’s longest waiting lists. Nonetheless, the PHI argues that
low-income racial minorities would prefer to stay in central-city
neighborhoods, despite those neighborhoods’ existing segregation
or badly-performing schools, and that subsidized housing must be
234
built in these communities to accommodate them.
The PHI also argues that concentrating subsidized housing in
poor neighborhoods will revitalize the housing markets of those
235
neighborhoods. But there is little evidence of any sustained or
transformative revitalization during the last three decades of
236
building subsidized housing in these neighborhoods. Nor is there
good evidence of long-term economic development benefits of
237
concentrating subsidized housing anywhere else in the country.
In fact, studies on local subsidized housing projects suggest that
238
major projects have no effect at all on neighborhood recovery.
For some civil rights advocates, this is a familiar story—
Minnesota is not the only place where development interests have
succeeded in convincing politicians that affordable housing is
synonymous with civil rights. But events in other regions also show
that ignoring segregation can have costs. In 2009, Westchester
County, a relatively progressive suburb of New York, was sued for its
239
failure to remedy racial isolation.
The county’s federally-

232. Statistics are from U.S. Census American Community Survey and
Housing and Urban Development data compiled by the Institute on Metropolitan
Opportunity, University of Minnesota Law School. Data is on file with author and
is available upon request.
233. See MINN. HOUS. P’SHIP, SURVEY OF APPLICANTS TO THE MINNEAPOLIS PUBLIC
HOUSING
AUTHORITY
SECTION
8
WAITING
LIST
3
(2008),
http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/SIRR-MN-2008-3.pdf.
234. See, e.g., Amanda Kolson Hurley, When Integrating the Suburbs Isn’t Enough,
CITYLAB.COM (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.citylab.com/housing/2016/02/when
-integrating-the-suburbs-isnt-enough/462765/ (providing statements from several
people connected to community developers, including the primary lobbyist in
Minnesota for PHI).
235. REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note 31, at 28.
236. Id. at 25.
237. JILL KHADDURI, KIMBERLY BURNETT & DAVID RODDA, TARGETING HOUSING
PRODUCTION
SUBSIDIES:
LITERATURE
REVIEW
63
(2003),
https://www.huduser.gov/publications/pdf/targetinglitreview.pdf.
238. REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note 31, at 26–
30.
239. U.S. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. v. Westchester Cty., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548
(S.D.N.Y 2009).
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mandated analysis of impediments to fair housing had almost
completely ignored the issues of race and segregation; the county
claimed that “the most pressing impediment to fair housing was the
lack of affordable housing stock” and that it had done “an
240
outstanding job in increasing the stock of affordable housing.”
241
The county had indeed added thousands of affordable units,
though many of its wealthy municipalities contributed little to this
242
effort. But, in an ominous decision for the Twin Cities, a federal
243
Pointing out that “fair
judge decided this was insufficient.
housing” and “affordable housing” are distinct concepts, she
determined that the county had defrauded the federal government
when it claimed to have fulfilled its housing-related civil rights
244
obligations.
V. THE PHI AND PEC TODAY
The PHI has grown ever more influential, and today it
functions, in essence, as its own sector of industry. Community
Development Corporations (“CDCs”) alone account for revenues
approaching $200 million per year, distributed across dozens of
245
organizations with thousands of employees, and a dense network
of financial professionals specializing in affordable-housing
246
funding has grown to support these institutions. Today, most
workers in the field of affordable housing come from a financial or
development background and have little or no connection to
247
metropolitan policymaking or civil rights.
240. Id. at 551.
241. See id. at 564–65.
242. See id. at 559.
243. See id. at 564–565.
244. Id. at 554–55.
245. See REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING POLICY IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note
31, at 26–30.
HOUSING
CONF.,
246. See,
e.g.,
Current
NHC
Members,
NAT’L
http://www.nhc.org/members (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (listing the largest
partners of NHC, a national organization for affordable housing, as four large
financial or investment institutions); Learn More about SHOP Home Mortgage, SHOP
HOME MORTGAGE, http://www.shop-mortgage.org/about-shop-home-mortgage
(last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (explaining that SHOP is an organization in the greater
Twin Cities that partners with financial institutions and other organizations to
provide home mortgages).
OF
OPPORTUNITY,
247. See,
e.g.,
Leadership,
CORRIDORS
http://www.corridorsofopportunity.org/partners/leadership (last visited Dec. 13,
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In the public sector, the affordable housing policy apparatus
has changed course to accommodate these new participants, with
248
their
heavily-financialized,
entrepreneurial
outlook.
Consequently, policymakers have minimized the role of integration
even as a secondary aim of affordable development; for instance,
the state today awards only 9 out of 246 available priority points for
LIHTC projects located in an economically integrated
neighborhood and no points at all for projects in white or racially
249
integrated locations.
In the early 2000s, Twin Cities nonprofit foundations, which
heretofore had been strong supporters of integrated schools and
neighborhoods, also began dramatically increasing funding to
250
supporters of central-city housing and charter schools. Their
251
support for integration and civil rights seemed to diminish.
By the time Mark Dayton was elected governor, members of
the PHI would monopolize appointments to state agencies involved
in housing and metropolitan development. Susan Haigh, the
president of low-income housing developer Habitat for Humanity
and an alumna of the affordable housing community, was
252
At the head of the
appointed chair of the Met Council.
Minnesota Housing Finance Agency was Mary Tingerthal, a
financial professional who, according to her official biography,
“coordinated the work of the Housing Partnership Fund . . . ,
Housing Partnership Ventures, [and] the Charter School

2016). Although a selection of the leaders on this list work in community focused
organizations, many work in for-profit or government positions. Id.
248. See Rieth, supra note 120, at 287 (“This program serves not as a means to
further fair housing, but rather favors expensive placements in segregated areas or
communities in danger of re-segregating.”).
249. See MINN. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, LIHTC SELF-SCORING WORKSHEET (2013),
http://www.mnhousing.gov/get/MHFA_012461.
250. Trends are from data compiled by the Institute of Metropolitan
Opportunity, University of Minnesota Law School. Data is on file with author and
is available upon request. Authors went through grant lists and 990 tax forms to
determine how much money was going to civil rights, charters, and community
developers. See Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax, I.R.S. (Aug.
2, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/uac/about-form-990 (“Tax-exempt organizations,
nonexempt charitable trusts, and section 527 political organizations file [a 990]
form to provide the IRS with the information required by section 6033.”).
251. Id.
252. See Meet Our Leadership Team, TWIN CITIES HABITAT FOR HUMANITY,
https://www.tchabitat.org/about/leadership#1 (last visited Dec. 13, 2016).
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Financing Partnership, a new conduit for charter school
253
loans . . . .”
The PHI has evolved to keep abreast of new trends in urban
development, such as increased enthusiasm for transit-oriented
254
planning. But as a consequence of the industry’s risk-averse,
technocratic leadership and minimal institutional expertise in civil
rights, these efforts have almost always resulted in funding being
255
directed into segregated urban neighborhoods. For example, in
2007, many of the largest participants in affordable housing
development teamed up with transit advocates and other regional
reform groups to create Corridors of Opportunity, which would
help distribute millions of dollars of new federal and philanthropic
256
support. Many of these millions ended up funding housing
projects along the region’s new Green Line light rail, as part of an
257
attempt to create 4500 affordable units along the transit corridor.
Despite the fact that the Green Line passes through relatively
affluent areas of both central cities, virtually all of the planned
affordable units were located in one heavily-impoverished stretch in
Saint Paul, including one neighborhood which boasts the dubious
258
distinction of being the state’s second-poorest census tract.

253. Governing
Board,
NAT’L
COMMUNITY
INV.
FUND,
http://www.ncif.org/connect/about-ncif/ncif-trustees (last visited Dec. 13, 2016).
OF
OPPORTUNITY,
HOUSING/TRANSIT-ORIENTED
254. See
CORRIDORS
DEVELOPMENT LOAN PROGRAM REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS 1 (Aug. 15, 2011),
http://tcclandbank.org/downloads/Corridors-of-Opportunity-RFP.pdf.
255. See, e.g., The Poverty Housing Industry Is a Problem, HOUSINGWIRE (Feb. 28,
2015),
http://www.housingwire.com/blogs/1-rewired/post/36385-the-poverty
-housing-industry-is-a-problem (discussing that housing funding must be
distributed in a more even way, “rather than concentrating such projects in
distressed, low-income, minority neighborhoods”).
256. CORRIDORS OF OPPORTUNITY, supra note 254, at 1 (“[T]he partner lending
institutions of the [Corridors of Opportunity] Initiative, will lend up to $14.3
million for the acquisition, rehabilitation, construction, and preservation of single
family and multifamily affordable housing . . . and large multifamily housing or
mixed-use transit oriented developments along . . . [the Green Line].”).
257. TWIN CITIES LOCAL INITIATIVES SUPPORT CORP., CENTRAL CORRIDOR
AFFORDABLE HOUSING COORDINATED PLAN: RECOMMENDED POLICIES AND STRATEGIES
5 (Jan. 2012), http://www.tclisc.org/PDFs/big_picture.pdf (explaining The Big
Picture Project’s expanded goal to achieve 4500 affordable housing units between
2011–2020).
258. See Frogtown/Thomas-Dale Neighborhood, MINN. COMPASS, http://
www.mncompass.org/profiles/neighborhoods/st-paul/frogtown-thomas-dale (last
visited Dec. 13, 2016).
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In some ways, Corridors of Opportunity looks like the PHI in
microcosm. It is led by a board composed of public officials and
community organizations from Minneapolis and Saint Paul,
affordable housing financiers, and a number of charter school
259
affiliates. Notable members include: the vice president of the
Family Housing Fund (the “Fund”); the executive director of the
Twin Cities branch of Local Initiatives Support Corporation
(LISC), a financial organization which supports affordable housing
nationwide; the president and CEO of Twin Cities Community
Land Bank, the Family Housing Fund’s subsidiary; a member of the
Itasca Project, a group run by the national consulting firm
McKinsey & Co., which promotes charter schools across the Twin
Cities region; a president and CEO of a local charter school; the
executive director of Nexus Community Partners, a community
development organization focusing almost entirely on the poorest
neighborhoods in North and South Minneapolis and Eastern Saint
Paul; and the executive director of the Cornerstone Group, a for260
profit real-estate company. Met Council President Susan Haigh,
261
formerly of Habitat for Humanity, sits as a co-chair. There are no
board members from civil rights organizations.
Besides showing the tangle of interests promoting inner-city
affordable housing, Corridors of Opportunity illustrates another
feature of the PHI: its tendency to blur the lines between the public
and private sector. Corridors of Opportunity is theoretically a
public entity, though it is largely composed of individuals from the
private and nonprofit sectors. But to spur development along the
Green Line, it works closely with a private-sector counterpart, the
262
The Funders
Central Corridor Funders Collaborative.
Collaborative, confusingly, includes many of the same members as
Corridors of Opportunity, including LISC, the TCC Land Bank, the
263
Family Housing Fund, and the Met Council. Making matters
259. Leadership, CORRIDORS OF OPPORTUNITY, supra note 247.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See Funders Collaborative and Corridors of Opportunity Recognized in Secretary’s
Award Presented to the Saint Paul Foundation, CENT. CORRIDOR FUNDERS
COLLABORATIVE BLOG (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.funderscollaborative.org/blog
-archive/funders-collaborative-and-corridors-of-opportunity-recognized-in
-secretarys-award-presented-to-the-saint-paul-foundation.
263. See CENT. CORRIDOR FUNDERS COLLABORATIVE, THE BIG PICTURE PROJECT:
PROGRESS REPORT 2016 (2016), http://www.funderscollaborative.org/wp-content
/uploads/2016/04/BigPictureProgressReport2016Finalsingles.compressed.pdf.
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worse, some of the organizations involved—for instance, the Family
Housing Fund—have at times been described as “quasipublic” in
264
character. For outsiders, this labyrinth of collaboration makes it
next to impossible to monitor the use of public money, to
safeguard civil rights responsibilities, and to efficiently utilize
disclosure laws.
The PEC is somewhat more centralized and interconnected
than the PHI, with local advocacy organizations relying more than
housing developers on the charitable contributions of extremely
wealthy benefactors and major foundations. For instance, in 2014,
the Bush Foundation awarded $200,000 in “Education Ecosystem”
grants to nearly a dozen Twin Cities education reform
265
organizations. “Ecosystem” is an appropriate descriptor, as many
of the recipients are closely intertwined, sometimes in ways that call
their independence into question. For example, grant recipient
Charter School Partners, theoretically an analysis and research
organization, shared an office with fellow recipient MinnCAN, the
former Minnesota chapter of national charter advocacy
266
organization 50CAN. National “grassroots” advocacy groups, such
The Big Picture Project, a collaborative project aimed at creating affordable
housing and strengthening public and private investment in low-income
neighborhoods, is hosted, in part, by Twin Cities LISC and supported by the
Central Corridor Funders Collaborative. Id. at 8. Big Picture Oversight team
members include individuals from the Metropolitan Council, Twin Cities LISC,
and Family Housing Fund. Id. at 2; see also Affordable Housing: Other Investments,
CORRIDOR
FUNDERS
COLLABORATIVE,
CENT.
http://www.funderscollaborative.org/affordable-housing/other-investments (last
visited Dec. 13, 2016) (“The Funders Collaborative provided seed funding to the
Twin Cities Community Land Bank for the purposes of acquiring strategic
buildings or parcels of land along the Green Line for equitable development
purposes.”).
264. Taylor Gee, Something Is Rotten in the State of Minnesota, POLITICO (July 16,
2016)
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/07/minnesota-race
-inequality-philando-castile-214053.
FOUND.,
265. Minnesota
Education
Equity
Partnership,
BUSH
https://www.bushfoundation.org/minnesota-education-equity-partnership
(last
visited Dec. 13, 2016).
266. See Sarah Lahm, MinnCAN Shifts as Minneapolis School Board Race Gets
(Oct.
1,
2016),
“Animated,”
BRIGHT LIGHTS SMALL CITY BLOG
http://www.brightlightsmallcity.com/minncan-shifts-as-minneapolis-school-board
-race-gets-animated. Although the groups once shared office space, both
MinnCAN and Charter School Partners have since disbanded. See id.
(“[MinnCAN] shared space in southeast Minneapolis with local, but now defunct,
charter school champions, Charter School Partners.”); Andrea Roethke, Thank

52

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1

as Students for Education Reform and Educators 4 Excellence,
have been very active in the Twin Cities. The national media has
frequently accused these two groups of serving as front
organizations for wealthy donors, using their considerable financial
resources to recruit thousands of rank-and-file members and
267
creating the appearance of organic education advocacy. At times,
PEC organizations have come under scrutiny in local media for
acting as financial conduits between national financiers and local
268
school politics.
Beyond these advocacy and support organizations, the PEC
also includes, of course, hundreds of charter schools themselves.
While some of these are simply small specialty institutions, such as
Montessori schools, others are large and powerful regional actors.
Charter superintendents sometimes earn considerably higher
salaries than their counterparts in traditional public schools. One
local charter “entrepreneur” attracted criticism when his personal
compensation exceeded $270,000; his schools also employed
several family members, bringing total compensation to more than
269
$400,000. Other Twin Cities charters are members of national
charter school networks such as KIPP—schools that have been

You, MINNCAN BLOG (Sept. 28, 2016), https://minncan.org/blog/thank-you-2
(announcing that MinnCAN had disbanded).
267. See, e.g., Valerie Strauss, How to Spot a Fake ‘Grassroots’ Education Reform
POST
(Oct.
12,
2014),
Group,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2014/10/12/how-to
-spot-a-fake-grassroots-education-reform-group.
268. Alejandra Matos, Out-of-State Money Pouring into Minneapolis School Board
TRIB.
(Minneapolis-Saint
Paul)
(Oct.
30,
2014),
Race,
STAR
http://www.startribune.com/out-of-state-money-pouring-into-minneapolis-school
-board-race/280863712.
269. Steve Brandt, Mahmoud’s 273K Salary Raises Eyebrows, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis-Saint
Paul)
(Aug.
15,
2012),
http://www.startribune.com/mahmoud-s-273k-salary-raises-eyebrows/166274586.
By contrast, charters usually pay their teachers low wages and provide few benefits,
leading to high turnover. Compare MINN. ASS’N OF CHARTER SCH., MINNESOTA
CHARTER SCHOOLS ANNUAL COMPENSATION (SALARY & BENEFITS) SURVEY REPORT 2008
FINDINGS
1,
http://www.mncharterschools.org/_uls/resources
/2008_Compensation_Summary.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2017) (listing the
average salary and benefits package for licensed Minnesota charter school teachers
as $46,792), with NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, RANKINGS AND ESTIMATES 19 (Dec. 2011),
http://www.nea.org/assets/docs/NEA_Rankings_And_Estimates_FINAL
_20120209.pdf (listing the average base salary for Minnesota public school
teachers as $53,680).
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frequently accused of practicing “corporate-style, finance-driven”
education, roughly analogous to the dominant approach in
270
affordable housing construction.
In some cases, charter schools have hidden connections to forprofit companies. For example, Minnesota offers several online
“virtual” high schools, which are largely based out of rural locales
271
such as Fergus Falls or Houston, Minnesota. Although ostensibly
public schools like any other, these online schools pay millions of
dollars a year to purchase curriculums from for-profit companies
like K12 Incorporated, which help set up the schools and provide
272
ongoing technical and instructional support. Elsewhere in the
nation, online high schools have been heavily criticized for
providing low-quality education and failing to assist the struggling
273
students they often court.
Studies of student performance in Twin Cities charter schools
have established that they underperform traditional public schools
274
and have done so for all twenty years of their existence. For all
the attention and publicity they receive, and for all the corporate
and philanthropic support they muster, charter schools are not
only more segregated than traditional public schools, but actively
contribute to greater segregation and weaker educational

270. See Jerusha Conner, Public Schools Are a Public Good, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 16,
2015,
11:15
AM),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/knowledge-bank
/2015/04/16/charter-schools-threaten-a-cornerstone-of-american-democracy.
271. See, e.g., MINN. VIRTUAL ACAD., http://mnva.k12.com/who-we-are
/letter2.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (stating that Minnesota Virtual Academy
is a program of Houston Public Schools).
272. Information about the contractual relationship between the Fergus Falls
and Houston School Districts and charter support companies was obtained
through a Minnesota Data Practices Act request.
273. See, e.g., Trip Gabriel, More Pupils Are Learning Online, Fueling Debate on
TIMES
(Apr.
5,
2011),
Quality,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/06/education/06online.html (stating that
online education saves states money but does nothing to reduce the need for
remedial college courses when students take online courses to make up for failed
brick-and-mortar courses).
274. See generally Kim McGuire, Charter Schools Struggling to Meet Academic
TRIB.
(Minneapolis-Saint
Paul)
(Feb.
17,
2015),
Growth,
STAR
http://www.startribune.com/charter-schools-struggling-to-meet-academic-growth
/292139891/.
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outcomes in the school system. The PEC has created a race to the
276
bottom, rather than a race to the top.
VI. A BETTER SOLUTION
Could the current divided state of the Twin Cities have been
avoided? One very clear and straightforward path to a more
integrated region would have been to more evenly distribute
subsidized housing across the metropolitan area. A more proactive
approach to the location of LIHTC, Section 8 project-based
housing, and Section 8 voucher-eligible rental units could have
made a serious dent in regional segregation, creating betterintegrated schools. Better-integrated schools, in turn would reduce
many of the pressures that drive white flight and create housing
277
segregation.
This is clearly demonstrated by a simulation of the racial makeup of Twin Cities schools in a region where the existing subsidized
housing stock is evenly distributed. For the purposes of the
simulation, an integrated school was defined as one with nonwhite
enrollment between twenty and sixty percent—a range consistent
278
with most definitions. In 2012–2013, 230 of the roughly 500
schools with defined attendance boundaries in the seven-county
279
280
region had racial mixes in this range; 86 schools had nonwhite
shares greater than 60%; and 175 schools had nonwhite shares less
281
than 20%. If integrating all schools was achieved simply by having

275. See, e.g., CHARTER SCHOOLS IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note 158, at 13.
276. See generally supra Section III.B (discussing the PEC’s role in promoting
Minnesota charter schools).
277. See THE RISE OF WHITE-SEGREGATED SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 21, at
8.
278. HALLEY POTTER, KIMBERLY QUICK & ELIZABETH DAVIS, THE CENTURY
FOUND., A NEW WAVE OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION (Feb. 9, 2016),
https://tcf.org/content/report/a-new-wave-of-school-integration/
(“Social
scientists and education researchers sometimes use enrollment at or above 70
percent of a single racial or ethnic group as a threshold for measuring racial
isolation.”).
279. The “Twin Cities Region” is a “thriving community of nearly 3 million
people, in 7 counties and 182 communities, encompassing nearly 3,000 square
miles.” The Twin Cities Region, METRO. COUNCIL, https://metrocouncil.org/About
-Us/Who-We-Are/The-Twin-Cities-region.aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 2017).
280. This definition excludes charter, magnet, and special purpose schools
without clearly defined attendance boundaries.
281. See infra Figure 6 (“Table 2”) in this Part.
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students of appropriate races in the appropriate schools trade
places, then roughly 12,100 nonwhite students in schools above the
60% ceiling would have to trade places with 12,100 white students
282
in schools below the 20% floor. However, a choice program
would be unlikely to actually result in one-for-one trades across
283
schools.
Instead, if only 75% of the nonwhite students leaving
predominantly nonwhite schools were replaced by white students,
then about 14,850 nonwhite students would have to relocate to
predominantly white and already-integrated schools in order for all
schools to be below the 60% ceiling. If 50% of moving nonwhite
students were replaced by white students, then 17,750 nonwhite
students would have to move. Although these numbers are nontrivial, they nonetheless represent only a fraction of nonwhite
enrollment in the seven-county metropolitan area: in the most
optimistic scenario, only 7% nonwhite students would change
schools, while in the least optimistic, only 11% would. In other
words, integration can still be achieved with relatively minor
enrollment transfers.
Figure 6 (“Table 2”) shows the potential impact of making
changes in the existing distributions of LIHTC and Section 8 units
284
The
and in the racial mix of subsidized housing residents.
simulations show the potential integrative impacts if (1) subsidized
units had been distributed across the region in proportions equal
to the distribution of students in the region’s schools and (2) the
racial mix of residents of those units were the same everywhere.
The children in each of the households in subsidized units were
285
then assumed to attend the relevant neighborhood school.

282. See infra Figure 6 (“Table 2”) in this Part.
283. See, e.g., FAILED PROMISES, supra note 44, at 28, 49.
284. Race data is available for LIHTC, Section 8 vouchers, and most (roughly
two-thirds) Section 8 project-based units. Race distributions for Section 8 projectbased units with no race data were estimated using the racial make-up of the
Section 8 project-based sites closest to each unit missing data.
285. The number of children per subsidized unit was estimated using
household data from the United States Bureau of the Census. The number and
age distribution of children per unit were allowed to vary by race. Children in
subsidized units were then assigned to the neighborhood elementary, middle, and
high schools based on the estimated age distribution for all subsidized units
“assigned” to specific school attendance boundaries.
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Figure 6.
The program with the greatest potential impact is the Section
286
8 voucher program. If Section 8 voucher usage was distributed
286.

See Housing Choice Voucher Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV.,
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evenly across the region and the distribution of households was
race-neutral, a total of 5531 nonwhite students currently in
predominantly nonwhite schools would instead be attending a
287
racially balanced school. The fact that the greatest potential for
pro-integrative actions lies with the voucher program is
encouraging in one way because changing the regional distribution
of Section 8 vouchers does not necessarily involve one-for-one
288
construction of new units in areas with shortfalls. In many areas,
existing rental units could fill the void simply by increasing the
289
number of landlords who accept vouchers. On the other hand,
resistance to vouchers is still significant in many parts of the
290
region.
Adding the effects of equalizing the distribution of LIHTC and
Section 8 project-based units increases the total number of
nonwhite students in racially balanced schools to 9729. This
represents a very substantial share of the total number of moves
needed to eliminate racially segregated schools (predominantly
291
white as well as predominantly nonwhite) in the region. Fully
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/housing_choice_voucher
_program_section_8 (last visited Dec. 13, 2016); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)
(2016) (codifying the Section 8 voucher program); 24 C.F.R. § 982.1 (2016)
(providing the description and purpose of the HUD Housing Choice Voucher
program).
287. But cf. Michelle Wilde Anderson, Colorblind Segregation: Equal Protection as
a Bar to Neighborhood Integration, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 841, 870 (2004) (“Even if the
technical purification of tenant assignment practices and equal distribution of site
selection were to occur (though there is evidence to the contrary), it would
provide a feeble corrective for the inertia of thousands of apartments, hundreds of
developments, and numerous cities ordered according to race.”).
288. See Stephanie DeLuca et al., Segregating Shelter: How Housing Policies Shape
the Residential Locations of Low-Income Minority Families, 647 ANNALS 268, 273 (2013)
(“Those that could not be accommodated in the new housing developments were
given the option to relocate to another public housing project, receive vouchers to
find rental units in the private market, or relocate without any form of housing
assistance.”).
289. But cf. Laura Bacon, Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey: Creating A Meaningful
Choice for Housing Choice Voucher Holders, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1273, 1297 (2006)
(“The widespread refusal of landlords to rent to voucher-holders may be the ‘most
serious obstacle’ to the utility of the Section 8 Program.”).
290. See generally Christopher Swope, Subsidizing Blight, GOVERNING (May
2002),
http://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/housing
/Subsidizing-Blight.html (discussing the destabilizing effect of multiple interests
in the Section 8 voucher program).
291. See Hobday, Finn & Orfield, supra note 173, at 939–40 (“After nearly ten
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80% of the needed moves would now be unnecessary if the region
had distributed the existing stock of subsidized housing in a
292
location- and race-neutral fashion. And even if only 75% of
nonwhite students leaving predominantly nonwhite schools are
replaced by white students, two-thirds of the needed “moves” would
293
In other words, if subsidized housing was
be unnecessary.
currently distributed more equitably, it would be unnecessary to
even discuss perennially controversial topics like pro-integrative
school boundary reforms or busing programs.
These simulations represent fairly rough estimates. And as
previously discussed, there are forces in education policy that both
actively promote greater segregation and insulate existing
294
segregation from legal and administrative remedies. For instance,
as long as charter schools and open enrollment remain exempted
from the state’s desegregation rule, privileged racial groups can use
these alternative education systems as safe enclaves from
295
integration.
However, despite these caveats, the fundamental message of
these models is clear. Over long periods of time, relatively modest
housing policy changes have the potential to make a serious dent in
296
school segregation. Further, many of these very worthy programs
297
currently have long waiting lists for participation. If they were

years of Minnesota’s educational school-choice experiment, segregation in
Minnesota schools has only intensified—its students of color have steadily become
more isolated in high-poverty, low-performing schools.”).
292. Myron Orfield, Regional Strategies for Racial Integration of Schools and
Housing Post-Parents Involved, 29 LAW & INEQ. 149, 165 (2011) (“For instance, if
LIHTC and project-based Section 8 units were assigned randomly by race and
located across the region in the same proportions as the overall population, then
the region would be nearly a third of the way to the goal of integrated schools.”).
293. Id.
294. Cf. Cindy Lavorato & Frank Spencer, Back to the Future with Race-Based
Mandates: A Response to Missed Opportunity, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1747, 1794–
1805 (2010) (detailing the forces of segregation in two Minnesota school districts).
295. Myron Orfield, Choice, Equal Protection, and Metropolitan Integration: The
Hope of the Minneapolis Desegregation Settlement, 24 LAW & INEQ. 269, 340 (2006).
296. J. William Callison, Achieving Our Country: Geographic Desegregation and the
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, 19 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 101, 118 (2010)
(“[T]his Article proposes using the Federal Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
(LIHTC) program as a tool for improving integration in high-income areas with
the greatest resources. Advocates for school integration have long argued that
school integration has a strong, positive impact on residential integration.”).
297. Rebecca T. Rotem, Using Disparate Impact Analysis in Fair Housing Act
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expanded to levels commensurate with demand and modified to
reflect the modest changes included in the simulations, these
programs have the potential to eventually create something very
298
special in America—a stably integrated regional school system.
The longer we leave this opportunity untapped, the more it
demands to be considered.
VII. CONCLUSION
The numbers of highly segregated schools and neighborhoods
in the Twin Cities are increasing rapidly, as is the growth of
299
concentrated poverty. It does not have to be this way. Minnesota
300
had laws to prevent it.
When they were implemented and
301
enforced, they were effective. Sadly, political leaders from both
parties dismantled the civil rights protections designed to prevent
302
highly segregated schools. Fair housing laws are still on the
303
books, but they haven’t guided housing policies for decades.
304
Political leaders are now set to further weaken these laws. This
political apathy has allowed highly profitable engines of
305
segregation to flourish in our schools and neighborhoods. A
Claims: Landlord Withdrawal from the Section 8 Voucher Program, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
1971, 1978 (2010).
298. Cf. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, 85 N.C. L. REV.
1545, 1568–69 (2007) (“While public school choice is an important tool for
achieving socioeconomic school integration, housing policy offers a
complementary strategy.”).
299. See supra Part II.
300. See MINN. STAT. §§ 363A.09, 473.25–255 (2016).
301. See supra Part IV.
302. See Christoper P. McCormack, Note, Business Necessity in Title VIII:
Importing an Employment Discrimination Doctrine into the Fair Housing Act., 54
FORDHAM L. REV. 563, 578–79 (1986) (“It is also clear, however, that racially
neutral practices of business and governmental actors in the housing sphere
disproportionately limit the housing opportunities of members of protected
groups.”). Cf. Kriston Capps, Why Democrats and Republicans Need to Talk About
Affordable Housing, CITYLAB (July 26, 2016), http://www.citylab.com/politics/2016
/07/why-democrats-and-republicans-need-to-talk-about-affordable-housing
/492959/ (explaining that affordable housing is a neutral topic that both parties
should discuss).
303. See Semuels, supra note 4; see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 363A.09.
304. Kriston Capps, What’s at Stake in Trump’s Pick to Lead HUD, CITYLAB (Nov.
11, 2016), http://www.citylab.com/housing/2016/11/trump-and-the-future-of-fair
-and-affordable-housing/507269/.
305. See supra Part IV.
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number of influential entities now have hundreds of millions of
dollars, thousands of employees, stunning political power, and a
306
vested interest in maintaining the segregated society they service.
Indeed, as things are today, we could refer to a SHI—segregated
housing industry—instead of a PHI; the PEC may as well be the
SPEC.
One common set of buzzwords used to defend the allocation
of resources to segregated neighborhoods is “equity in place”: the
notion that low-income communities of colors can be and should
be restored from poverty without any fundamental change to living
307
patterns. But to civil rights advocates, not to mention many
members of the communities in question, “equity in place” sounds
308
suspiciously like “separate but equal.” There is, after all, a long
tradition in American society of asking segregated communities to
self-improve—while remaining segregated. This approach has not
309
been exclusively the province of racists and racial supremacists.
In the aftermath of the Civil War, prominent writers and scholars
(white and nonwhite alike) theorized that freed slaves must
undergo “moral uplift” before joining middle-class society and that
310
Today’s
otherwise, integration could only bring chaos.
policymakers use more sensitive language, but sometimes echoes of
311
“moral uplift” appear in their recommendations.
Whether
because of ideology, convenience, or simple carelessness, both the
PHI and PEC have at times defended the idea that the solution to
long-standing racial inequality is not social change but simple
306. See Michelle Adams, Separate and UnEqual: Housing Choice, Mobility, and
Equalization in the Federally Subsidized Housing Program, 71 TUL. L. REV. 413, 430
(1996) (“But vast residential segregation on the basis of race did not develop
overnight; its antecedents lie in actions taken by a myriad of private actors, aided
in substantial part by local, state, and federal governmental entities.”).
307. See Lisa M. Krzewinski, Section 8’s Failure to Integrate: The Interaction of ClassBased and Racial Discrimination, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 315, 320–21 (2001)
(reviewing Stephen Grant Meyer’s 2000 book, As Long as They Don’t Move Next Door,
and stating that “many recipients end up using their subsidies to pay for their
current low-income housing units or move within their own segregated
neighborhoods; section 8 is clearly not helping poor minorities leave poor
minority neighborhoods”).
308. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (analyzing the “separate but
equal” doctrine and Jim Crow laws).
309. Frederick C. Harris, The Rise of Respectability Politics, THE DISSENT, Winter
2014, at 33, 34.
310. Id.
311. Id.
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largesse, directed from the government and the wealthy towards
312
Sometimes, these entities are
the poor and the segregated.
altruistic and genuinely well-meaning, but history and social
science alike show that their approach will probably never succeed.
For policymakers and politicians still interested in integration,
there is also an important broader lesson in the Twin Cities’ return
to segregation. For many years, civil rights advocates have treated
313
segregation as primarily a product of white racism. But the
Minnesota experience shows that racial separation isn’t always
driven solely by a desire to exclude. When policymakers become
apathetic about integration, economic forces and interest group
politics can work in concert to pull nonwhite citizens into
undesirable neighborhoods and failing schools, just as surely as
racism can keep the same beleaguered minorities out of white
314
enclaves. Because of this, true and permanent integration cannot
be effected by simply overcoming racial animus; advocates must
also overcome institutions that have grown up around a segregated
society and ultimately draw purpose from a segregated status quo.
Some of these same institutions may profess to represent a
progressive outlook or even work to help segregation’s victims.
Nonetheless, they remain invested in a society where racial
concentration is preserved, not remedied. If these forces are not
accounted for, even regions that have made remarkable progress
can backslide into racial separation and isolation. This is what
happened in Minnesota. Exclusionary pressures were comparatively
weak in Minneapolis and Saint Paul. Advocates of integration
assumed this alone was enough to create lasting social change.
They were wrong.
But it is not too late to create a truly integrated society. Doing
so would require a number of steps. Existing fair housing laws must
be maintained and enforced. Fundamental civil rights protections
315
must be applied to all parts of public education. Governments
and foundations must recommit to a racially integrated society, the
society that was Martin Luther King’s dream and that most
Americans still aspire to. Public and philanthropic funds should go
312. See supra Part IV.
313. J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND
THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 67 (1999).
314. See supra Part III.
315. john a. powell, Living and Learning: Linking Housing and Education, 80
MINN. L. REV. 749, 792–93 (1996).
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to organizations that affirmatively further fair housing practices,
not to those whose activities perpetuate segregation. And these
commitments must extend to the entire Twin Cities area, not just
to underprivileged pockets in Minneapolis and Saint Paul. The
poverty housing industry should become a partnership for
integrated housing; the poverty education complex should become
a partnership for equal opportunity in integrated schools.
Changing our current course will involve hard work and it may be
less profitable for many of the entities that currently control
housing and education policy. But our Minnesota values say that it
is necessary, and our history shows that it is possible.
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